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The demand for money deals with decisions of what proportion of the 
stock of wealth is held in the form of money. There is considerable 
controversy involved in the specification of the demand for money. The 
first of these controversies deals with the theoretical framework in 
which the demand for money can be specified. To Keynes [51), the theory 
of demand for money is concerned with explaining which factors determine 
the proportion of a financial portfolio held in the form of money as 
opposed to bonds. Friedman [29) treats the demand for money the same 
way he treats the demand for any other durable good. He basically 
argues that money, like any other asset, yields a flow of services to 
the person who holds it. This approach basically utilizes the general 
principle of the diminishing marginal rate of substitution between 
goods. 
Besides the differences concerning the proper theoretical framework 
to use, there are other disagreements; namely, is income or wealth the 
relevant restraint, and which measure is the relevant income or wealth 
variable? What is the relevant interest rate in the demand for money? 
With regard to the issue of the relevant interest rate, one may 
argue that the issue of long-term versus short-term interest rate has 
not been empirically settled. While Heller [44], Laidler [58) and 
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Goldfeld [35] [36] found that the short-term rate was the most appropri-
ate measure, others such as Hamburger (39] and Lee [56] concluded that 
long-term interest rates and yields on savings and loans shares are the 
most significant interest variables in the demand for money equations. 
In addition, Heller and Khan [45], following Friedman's [33) suggestion, 
argued that the question of the proper interest rate in the demand for 
money function should not be restricted to short-term versus long-term 
rates, but the entire term structure of interest rates should be used as 
the proper opportunity costs of money. The general conclusion seems 
that it is not yet possible to state confidently which particular inter-
est rate measure provides the most stable money demand function and the 
final judgment must await pending additional investigation, especially 
on the term structure of interest rates. 
This brief summary of the literature is an indication of the 
considerable amount of attention that has been devoted to the question 
of the relevant income variable and the relevant interest rat e. None of 
the cited studies has incorporated taxation of interest in its 
specification of the demand for money. For instance, the opportunity 
cost of holding money has typically been presented by the nominal rate 
of interest, and the concept of net rate of interest has been largely 
ignored. 
A possible explanation for this lack of interest may have to do 
with the fact that accurate and reliable statistical series on the mar-
ginal tax rate are not available. The argument based on the unavaila-
bility of the marginal tax rate series is no longer warranted -since 
Seater [7 3] and B·arro and Sahasakul (3] have provided procedures for 
estimating the corporate and individual marginal tax rate. 
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(3] have provided procedures for estimating the corporate and individual 
marginal tax rate. 
On theoretical grounds, a conventional money demand equation can be 
derived from a portfolio approach or transactions approach to the demand 
for money. Tobin [81], in his celebrated "Liquidity Preference as 
Behavior Towards Risk," argues that an increase in the proportional tax 
rate, with full offset provisions, increases the holding of risky assets 
in a portfolio of a given size. In other words, an increase in the tax 
rate decreases the demand for money (at a market rate of interest). On 
the other hand, followi ng Baumel's (4] inventory theoretic technique to 
the transaction demand for money, one can easily identify the key 
element in the model as the interest rate differential between bonds and 
money, which creates an interest cost of holding money. According to 
this theory, smaller money balances are associated with high interest 
earnings at the expense of higher transaction costs. Individuals are 
assumed to act so as to maximize interest earnings on interest bearing 
assets, net of transaction costs, by equating· the competing costs at the 
margin. However, for an individual who acts to maximize interest 
earnings, the relevant marginal opportunity cost of holding money is the 
after-tax rate of interest. This is most obvious since the yield on 
money is untaxed while the yield on all other assets falls as the 
marginal tax rate rises. This theory, therefore, predicts a positive 
and direct relationship between the tax-rate and the demand for money as 
a result of the effect of the tax-rate on the opportunity cost of 
holding money. 
Based on the theoretical works just presented, it can be seen that 
previous work on the topic has misspecified the demand for money 
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e quation. The conventional approach toward the demand for money is to 
make it a function of the nominal rate of interest and an income 
variable. This pattern is, however, appropriate only in a country 
withou t income taxes. In a country where interest receipts are taxable, 
the tax-variable also enters individual constraints and de t ermines 
behavior. The conclusion, therefore, follows that a fundamental aspect 
of the topic which has not ge nerally been observed in empirical work on 
the topic is the need to incorporate the tax rate into the demand for 
money. 
Objectives 
The standard procedure in demand for money investigations is to use 
the demand for money as a function of national income as a proxy for 
transaction demand and the rate of interest as a proxy for the 
opportunity costs of holding money. However, the purpose of this 
research is to investigate the theoretical and empirical implications of 
incorporating income taxation into the demand for money. Given the ever 
increasing importance of income taxation on the flow of income, one may 
argue that the standard formulation of the demand for money as a 
function of national income and the rate of interest is inappropriate. 
This study investigates the hypothesis that it is the net rate of 
· interest, i.e., interest rate after tax that is relevant to households' 
and firms' money holding decisions. 
Organization 
Chapter II of this study s erves two primary purposes. I t presents 
both theoretical and empirical work previously done on the demand for 
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money. Special emphasis is p l aced on the relationship between taxation 
and the degree of risk in an portfolio decision, and its implication on 
the demand for money. 
Chapter III is devoted to specifying the testable specifications 
for household, business, and aggregated demand for money. Also found in 
this chapter is a more thorough analysis of the theoretical justifica-
tion of each equation. Chapter III also develops the statistical and 
econometric framework for the study. Specifically, the statements of 
the hypotheses are presented. The chapter concludes with a brief dis-
cussion of the tests to be performed and a thorough discussion of the 
simultaneity and identification problem. 
Chapter IV applies the methodology to evaluate the proposed 
specification of the demand for money against its conventional form. An 
investigation of the alternative procedures, e.g., a simultaneous ap-
proach to the demand for money, appears at the end. 
Finally, Chapter V summarizes the dissertation and highlights its 
major findings. 
CHAPTER I I 
REVIEW OF LITERATUR£ 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the different theoretical 
arguments and major empirical findings in the area of the demand for 
money. Specifically, the following issues are addressed in considerable 
detail: What is the role of the interest rate in the money demand 
function? What is the most relevant interest rate to the determination 
of the demand for money? What is the most relevant scale variable? 
Does the demand for money appear to be stable over the years? 
The review of literature is organized as follows. The issue of 
interest rates is addressed first. In this section, two aspects of in-
terest rates are reviewed: The role of interest rates in the demand for 
money function and the question of what is the most relevant interest 
rate to the determination of the demand for money. The latter is 
addressed on two grounds. Following the theoretical work, it is argued 
that the most relevant measure of opportunity cost in the demand for 
money is the after tax rate of interest as opposed to the nominal rate 
of interest, followed by its implication on the dissertation. Next, the 
major empirical work is described and the issue of short-term versus 
long-term rate of interest is addressed. The problem of the relevant 
scale variable and the stability of the demand for money is discussed at 
the end. After discussing the major work on these subjects, a summary 
6 
s ection recaps the main points of the empirical results with regard to 
the above questions. 
The Interest Rate Issue 
Theoretical Work 
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The Role of the Interest Rate in the Demand for Money. The 
Keynesian approach to demand for money is based upon the famil iar tri-
p artite demand for money. This construction includes, first, a 
transactions demand--money held both by households and business finns 
"to bridge the interval between the receipt of income and its disburse-
me nt," [51, p. 195]; second, the precautionary-demand which sees money 
held to meet forthcoming monetary obligations and, third, the 
speculative-demand--money held by the public due to a lack of perfect 
foresight with respect to the future rate of interest and the 
uncertainty as to the future capital value of a fixed interest bearing 
asset. 
Keynes [51], in his discussion of the speculative and precautionary 
motives of holding money, has assumed that the former explicitly and the 
latter implicitly depend upon the rate of interest. For example, in his 
discussion of the speculative demand he argued that those who believe 
that future rates of interest will be above the rates assumed by the 
market have a reason for keeping cash, rather than holding bonds, and 
vice versa. With respect to the precautionary demand for money, Keynes 
argued that the essence for this demand is uncertainty about the future. 
Since the returns on bonds is risky, the individual has some motives to 
hold money. This incentive to hold money will depend on the current 
rate of interest, since the greater is this risk, the greater is the 
return on bonds; which will partially compensate for their riskiness. 
According to Keynes {51], the strength of the precautionary motive. 
depend(s] on what we may term the relative cost of holding 
cash. If the cash can only be retained by forgoing the 
purchase of a profitable asset, this increases the cost and 
thus we ake ns the motive towards holding a given amount of cash 
(p . 1 36]. 
So it appears that for Keynes this precautionary demand for money 
depends on the rate of interest. 
However, with respect to the transactions demand for money, Keynes 
argued that this motive is basically a function of the income and the 
normal length or the interval between its receipts and its disbursement. 
According to Keynes, the transactions demand for money is: 
generally irresponsive to any influence except the actual 
occurrence of a change in the general economic activity and 
the level of incomes; whereas experience indicates that the 
aggregate demand for money to s atisfy the s peculative motive 
usually shows a continuous response to gradual changes in the 
rate of interest [p. 197]. 
The conclusion follows that, assuming the interval between receipts 
and payments is constant and does not vary with the level of income, the 
transactions balance is a constant proportion of the money income. 
According to Keynes, this motive did not as a first approximation depend 
on the rate of interest. 
However, Baurnol (4] and Tobin (80] have explored the transactions 
demand and have demonstrated that under certain assumptions it too will 
d~pend on the rate of interest. Tobin [8 1] argued that a distinction 
should be made between the size of t he transactions balances and the 
composition of transactions balances. He ackn owledges that the size of 
the transa ctions balances in general depends on the institutional ar-
rangements that determine the length of t h e interval between individual 
receipts and expenditures. However, the composition of transactions 
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balances is another matter. Cash is not the only asset in which 
t ransactions balances can be held. According to the Tobin-Baumol model , 
p eople aim to maximize the return of their portfolios. The utility-
maximizing individual desires to hold some transactions balances in the 
form of interest earnings assets if the interest earned on these assets 
outweighs the cost involved in investing in bonds and disinvesting, and 
the inconvenience of the financial transactions involved. The conclu-
sion follows that the proportion of cash in transactions balances varies 
inversely with the rate of interest if one assumes that individuals are 
profit-maximizers. 
Today, all modern theories of the demand for money consider that 
interest rates on alternative assets are determinants of this demand. 
Keynesians have been able to explain this by either the theory of the 
speculative demand [81] or the modern theory of transactions demand [9 ] 
(80]. Even Friedman argues that his inability to pin down the interest 
elasticity of the demand for money is very differ~nt from assigning a 
zero value to it. According to Friedman, the interest elasticity is not 
very high and it appears to be less important as a determinant of the 
demand for money than real per capita permanent income. Despite this, 
he argued that "I kna.v no empirical student of the demand for money who 
denies that interest rates affect the real quantity of money demanded" 
[30, P• 1 42]. 
Taxation, Interest Rate and the Demand for Money. Closely related 
to the demand for money is the problem of explaining why people should 
hold money in their portfolio at all when they can hold interest earning 
assets such as bonds. Keynesians have been able to answer this question 
by arguing that there are two fundamental reasons: (1) the existence of 
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time and the fact that human action takes time and (2) uncertainty as to 
the future capital value of a fixed interest bearing asset. The first 
reason re f ers to the costs inherent in money transactions, of which the 
costs of investme nt and disinvestment are of great importance. The 
second reason, however, does not refer to general uncertainty, but to 
the uncertainty of the future rate of interest. That is, individuals 
are assumed to dislike risk on their assets and since bonds are assumed 
to be risky, whereas money is not, they have some reason for holding 
money rather than bonds [4] [81]. This i s, of course, the basis of 
Keynes's speculative motive. The specula tive demand for money plays a 
key role in the Keynesian demand for money theory, since Keynes con-
sistently used this element of the demand for money as a basis for his 
t he ory to establish the interest-elasticity of the demand for money. 
However, the speculative motive does not necessarily depend on the 
existence of uncertainty in order to be operati ve. It merely requires 
individuals to maximize the returns from their portfolios given their 
riskiness. 
Following the portfolio approach, it is obvious that in every 
investment decision the individual weighs the return or yield against 
the possible loss, or risk. The point that taxation reduces the yield 
is well established and is entirely evident, but the equally important 
r e lationship b e tween taxation and the degre e of risk has r eceived little 
attention in the empirical and theoretical approach to the demand for 
money. 
Damar and Musgrave [21] a r gued tha t by imposing an income tax, the 
Treasury becomes a partner of the investor, one who shares the gains but 
whose share of the losses depends th · upon e ~nvestor's ability to offset 
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losses.1 If losses cannot be offset, the investor carries the entire 
burden of the loss. In this case, the tax reduces the return, but 
leaves the degree of risk unchanged, so that the compensation per unit 
of risk-taking is reduced.2 Risk-taking becomes less attractive, so the 
investor has an incentive to take less r isk (substitution effect). But 
the reduction in return also means a lower income and so to maintain 
income, the investor's demand for risky investment increases, since 
risky investment can be expected to have a higher yield (income effect). 
A shift toward a more risky asset combination may be accomplished by 
reducing the proportion of the investor's total assets held in cash, 
that is, by larger total investment. The income and substitution 
effects of imposing a tax in this case are operating in opposing 
directions and therefore theoretically the final outcome of taxation on 
the proportion of total assets held in cash is uncertain. 
If a complete offset of losses is possible, the yield and the risk 
of investing in bonds is reduced by the rate of the tax, so that the 
compensation per unit of risk-taking remains unchanged. Consequently, 
the incentive to take less risk or the substitution effect of taxation 
disappears. The individual's income, however, will decline and to 
1Loss offset provision refers to favorable treatment of capital 
losses from unsuccessful investments. That is when capital losses 
.exceed capital gains, the realized capital losses may be deducted from 
taxable income. Such deductions reduce taxable income by the entire 
amount of capital losses. 
2The key to this analysis is the interpretation of the reward for 
risk. If the reward is measured, not in absolute amount nor in relation 
to the total investment but in relation to the net amount of capital at 
risk, then the reward for assumption of risk will be reduced relative to 
the net amount of capital at risk by an income tax (provided losses 
cannot be offset against taxable income), 
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restore it, he will take more risk , or by the same tOken he will reduce 
t he proportion of his total assets held in cash. 
This proposition can be proved following a mathematical approach to 
the effect of taxation on the portfolio s election decisions of expected 
utility maximizing investors [61) [76]. In the following approach the 
basic Demar-Musgrave proposition is re-examined on the basis of expected 
utility approach. The discussion is restricted to portfolio choices 
involving two assets only. The fo llowi ng notation is employed [61): 
x = rate of return on risky asset 
r = rate of return on riskless asset, equal to zero for money 
A investor's initial wealth 
a amount invested in the risky asset 
rn = A - a = amount held in the riskless asset 
t proportional tax rate on investment income 
Y = final wealth. 
Because of considerable pra ctical interest, this dissertation assumes 
that there are full loss offset provisions. 
It follows that final wealth in this case is given by 
Y = A + (1 - t) ax ( 1 ) 
Under the expected utility hypothesis the investor chooses the value of 
~, which maximizes 
or 
E [ U ( Y ) ) = E [ U (A + ( 1 - t ) ax) ] subject to 0 < a < A 
The first derivative of (2} is 
dE (U(Y)] =dE ~-U(Y} • dY j 
da dY da 
dE [ U (Y)) 
da 
E [U'(Y). (1- t) x] 
( 2) 
= ( 1 - t) E (U ' (Y) x) 
Following the same chain-rule applied above, the second derivative of 
( 2) is 
d 2 E (U(Y)) 
da2 
(1 - t)2 E [U"(Y)x2J 
To maximize the investor ' s expected utility then requires: 
E [U'(Y) x] = 0 






The investor is assumed to be risk averse, that is, U" (Y) is everywhere 
negative. This assumption implies that the second-order condition (6) 
is clearly satisfied for a risk-averting investor. The first-order 
condition (5) defines the optimal~ as a function of the tax parameter t 
and initial wealth A. Total differentiation of (5) gives the effect of 
changes in t on a . 
E [U' (Y)x) = 0 
E [xU"(Y) (dA + a(1 - t) dx + x(1 - t) da- axdt) + U' (Y)dx) = 0 
Assuming d.A = dx = 0 
E (xU"(Y) ( ( 1 -
E (x2uu(Y) ((1 -
Since E [x2u"(Y)] < o. 





axdt) l = 0 
adt)] = 0 
da = a 
dt 1-t 
The first observation on (7) is, of course, that it confirms the 
Demar-Musgrave conclusion, that an increased tax rate on investment 
income increases holdings of the risky asset. Thus holdings of cash 
should necessarily decline. 
(7) 
Tobin [81] came to the same conclusion, that an increase in 
rate, with full offset, increases the holding of the proportional tax 
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f · size According to Tobin, there risky asset in a portfolio o a g1ven • 
· between the proportion of the investor's is a positive relationsh1p 
wealth held in consols (A2 ) and the expected return. This can be shown 
as follows: 
R A2 (r + g) 
where R return on portfolio 
g capital gain or loss 
r = the current yield on consol. 
Since g is a random variable with an expected value of zero, the 
expected return on the portfolio is: 
( 8) 
on the other hand, the risk attached to the portfolio is to be measured 
by the standard deviation of R, or: 
since err 0 (9) 
Substituting (9) into (8) gives: 
( 1 0) 
Now (10) represents the locus of opportunity for risk and expected 
return which pictures the fact that the investor can expect more return 
if he assumes more risk. In this framework the result of a tax of t 
levied on interest income and capital gains, with complet e loss offset 
provision, would be to reduce the expected return per dollar of consols 
from r to r(1 - t) and to reduce the risk to the investor per dollar of 
consols from~ to {1 - t)og• The opportunity locus accordi ng to Tobin 
remains constant at r(1-t)OR/(1-t)cr9 = rOR/Og, but the imposition of 
taxation causes the risk consol line (9) to rotate further to the left. 
1S 
so it follows that a tax of this kind reduces the demand for money at any 
ma rket rate of interest. 3 
one s hortcoming of this theory is seen when considering the c ase i n 
which t h e investor divides his wealth between one riskl ess asset (money) 
and more than one risky asset. Feldstein [26] argued that the conclusion 
derived from this theory depends, critically, on the assumption that the 
portfolio contains only one risky asset. However, Richter [71] showed 
that with two risky assets and a quadratic utility function, the intro-
duction of a proportional tax with ful l loss offset would increase the 
pretax portfolio variance. Therefore, Hall [38] extended Richter's 
result to any case in which the investor's preference could be described 
in terms of the mean and variance of the portfolio yield. 
The conclusion follows that, although the conventional approach 
tCMard the demand for money is to make it a function of the nominal rate 
of interest and a scale variable, this pattern is appropriate only in 
the absence of income taxes. The imposition of income taxes alters the 
efficient asset combination through its effect on risk and yield of 
risky investment. The conclusion, therefore, follows that a fundamental 
aspect of the topic, which has not generally been observed in empirical 
work on the topic, is the need to incorporate the tax rate into the 
demand for money. 
Empirical Work. While income taxation had long ago been integrated 
i nto the analysis of most areas of economic behavior, the literature 
lacks direct empirical analysis of the response of the demand for money 
3This holds if there is a single t against income and capital gains. 
If there is a different capital gains rate, then the result is 
indeterminant. 
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to the tax rate. However, in order to show the empirical justification 
of incorporating the tax rate in the demand for the money, this study 
resorted to another approach, namely the empirical results of the 
effects of taxation on portfolio choice. 
In a 1949 survey, Butters (11] asked a nonrandom sample of 746 
active investors how they had responded to the rise in tax rates imposed 
in the 1940's. Sixty-nine percent indicated that it had no influence on 
t heir investment behavior, while twenty-two percent i ndicated that the 
higher tax rates induced them to hold a more conservative portfolio. 
A survey conducted by the University of Michigan Survey Research 
Center (2] also concluded that a large fraction of i nvestors were not 
influenced by tax considerations. They concluded that only a small 
minority of high-income people were aware of preferential tax treatment 
a nd, in f act, took advantage of it. 
Feldstein [26], in a comprehensive econometric paper, investigated 
the effects of taxes on household portfolio composition. He assumed 
that the composition of each household's portfolio depends on wealth and 
the perceived probability distribution of net asset yields. '!'he age and 
sex of the head of the household and the ratio of human capital to total 
wealth were also taken into consideration. He primarily focused on the 
impact of the tax system throug h its effects on relative yield while the 
effects on risk were not explicitly addressed. His results indicated 
that: (1) the personal income tax has a very powerful effect on 
individuals' demand for portfolio assets, (2) higher income individuals 
are encouraged to hold a larger share of their portfolios i n common 
stock and (3) the means of the pretax yield on individuals' portfolios 
are an increasing function of the individuals' tax ra t es. 
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L o ng-Term Versus Short-Term Rate of I n t erest. All modern theories 
of the demand for money consider t hat interest rates on alternative 
assets are determinants of this demand. •rhere is also an overwhelming 
b ody of evidence in favor of inclusion of some rate of interest in the 
demand for money, e.g., (49] (10] (53] [55]. However, with regf:lrd to 
the i ssue of the relevant interest rate, one may argue that the issue of 
long-term versus short-term interest rate has not been empirically 
settled. One attempt to clarify this i ssue was made by Heller [44]. 
Heller compared the explanatory powe r of the long-term rate of interest 
with· that of a s hort-term rate. Using quarterly observati ons for the 
period 1947-1958, he specified both M1 and M2 as dependent variables and 
concluded that the short-term rate was far superior than the l ong-term 
rate in explaining movements in the demand for money's both cases. 
He ller's conclusion was confirmed by Laidler [55]. Using annual 
data for the time period 1892- 1960, he specifi ed an equation i n 
log-linear form and used permanent income as the scale variable. His 
results indicated that, when M2 was used as the dependent variable, the 
short-term rate was found to be superior; while with money defined as 
M1 , there was no doubt of the superior explanatory power of the 
long-term rate. However, he concluded that a short-term rate is the 
relevant rate and " the contradictory results obtained with the M1 
definition of money reflect the fact that that definition is an 
unsatisfactory one" [p. 553]. The basis of his conclusion was his 
previous work [53) on which his results strongly supported the broad 
definition of money (M2) on the grounds of the stability of the money 
demand function. 
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This conclusion was confirmed by Friedman and Schwartz [31] and 
Goldfeld [35] (36]. Friedman and Schwartz specified a semi- l og equation 
in which they included the absolu te rather than logarithms of the rate 
of interes t in equation. Working with the annual data they concluded 
that "The short-term interest rate is preferable to the long, and there 
is no justification for including both" [p. 267] • 
Goldfeld (35] experimented with five different rates of inte rest in 
his study. The rates considered were: the rate on commercial paper 
(RCP); the rate on time deposits (RTD); the Treasury bill rate (RTB); a 
weighted average saving rate (RAVG); and the corporate bond rate (RCB}. 
His result indicated that a saving deposit rate of any sort increases 
the speed of adjustment from much less than 10 percent per quarter to 20 
percent. The corporate bond rate (a long-term rate) never achieved 
statistical significance and in some equations actually reported a 
positive coefficient. On balance, he argued RTD and RCP worked about as 
well as any other. In his 1976 study, Goldfeld [36] tes t ed several 
other alternatives. However, he concluded that, "It is hard to foresee 
much payoff from trying various interest rates" [p. 700]. Simulation 
performance of equations using alternatively the commercial paper rate 
and the Treasury bill were identical. The same was true for several 
different alternatives for time and saving deposits rates. Th e 
corporate bond rate, as a proxy for longer-term rates, was found to be 
inferior to either of the short-term market rates. The conc l usion 
follows as the short-term market rates were found to be superior to the 
longer-term rates. 
In an attempt to introduce an alternative t o Goldfeld's equation, 
Hamburger [41] specified the demand for real M1 as a function of real 
i ncome , lagged M1, and three rates of interest, namely, the commercial 
't t u.s. government bond rate and the dividend b ank s aving depos1 ra e, 
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price ratio on equities . His equation performed reasonably better than 
Goldfeld' s equation over the 1973-1977 time span. 
Despite the reasonable performance of Hamburger's equation, his 
work was criticized on two counts. Hafer and Hein (37) were able to 
show that Hamburger's imposed restriction on the long-run real income 
elasticity equal to unity was not supported by the data, and in addi-
tion, when the commercial paper rate wa s added to the equation it was 
statistically significant and this lowe red the significance of the gov-
ernment bond. Finally, when Hamburger's equation was adjusted for both 
of these shortcomings, they concluded that its root mean-squared error 
for dynamic forecasts exceeded that of the Goldfeld equation. 
The asserted superiority of the short-term rates was challenged by 
Hamburge r [39] and Lee [56]. Hamburger, concentrating on the household 
demand for money, concluded that long-term interest rates were the 
relevant determinants of its demand for cash balances. The basic 
argument put forth by Hamburger was, in the household demand for money, 
one should include two yields, one on debts and one on equities. 
Heller and Khan (45], following Friedman's [33] suggestion, argued 
that the question of the proper interest rate in the demand for money 
function should not be restricted to short-term versus long-term 
interest rates; rather, the entire term structure of interest rates 
should be used as the proper opportunity cost of money. This was done 
by first approximating the yield curve by a quadratic function. Heller 
and Khan then specified a demand for money equation in terms of their 
estimated term structure, real income and the lagged money variable. 
Es timating their money demand equation over the 1960:3-1976:4 time 
p eriod, they found their equation to be stable, using time trend 
r egression and a cusum test to test the stability of their equation. 
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Porter and Mauskopf [6B] reestimated the Heller and Khan equation 
to compare its forecasting error to that of Goldfeld's. Based on 
dynamic simulation over the 1974:3-1977:4 time period, they concluded 
that the cumulative prediction error of the HK equation was of the same 
order as the one produced by the standard Goldfeld equation. 
The conclusion follows that it is doubtful whether Heller and 
Khan's proposition to expand the range of the opportunity cost of money 
to include the entire term structure of interest rates provided any 
improvement over the standard Goldfeld equation as far as the prediction 
of money demand was concerned. 
The Issue of the Scale Variable 
The empirical evidence with regard to this subject can be broken 
into two categories: Those investigators who use annual data for their 
study and those who utilize quarterly data. The empirical findings are 
quite different according to the data used in the studies. By and 
large, three measures have most frequently been used as the scale vari-
able. The first of these is current income as a proxy for the volume of 
transactions to be affected by the money stock. Second is nonhuman 
wealth, measured as the consolidated net worth of the public; and, 
finally Friedman's permanent income proposed as a proxy for the wealth 
concept. Friedman [32] defined his permanent income as "those factors 
that the [economic] unit regards as determining its capital value or 
wealth: the nonhuman wealth it owns; the personal attributes of the 
earners of the unit, s uch as their training, ability, personality; the 
attributes of the economic a ctivity of the earners, such as the 
occupation followed, the location of the economic activity, and so on" 
[p. 21]. 
Friedman (29] found that a demand for money as a function of 
permanent income without an interest rate variable appeared to fit 
United States data for the period 1870-1954. Friedman converted his 
demand for money function to express an equation for desired velocity. 
He concluded that his estimated velocity has the same secular downward 
trend and the same tendency to rise in booms and fall in slumps as the 
actual velocity. 
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Although his results suggested that the data support the theory, 
his results were subject to heated debate. For one thing, his estimated 
coefficients implied that the elasticity of velocity with respect to 
permanent income is negative. Since the secular trend of current income 
is positively related to permanent income, this implied that as current 
income grows the velocity falls. His results, consequently, suggested 
that the elasticity of the demand for money with respect to permanent 
income is greater than one or is equal to 1.81. As permanent income 
rises, the demand for money rises more than proportionately. According 
to these findings, Friedman concluded that money is a luxury good. 
Meltzer [58] tested all three of the previously mentioned scale 
variables in log-linear equations that specified both M1 and M2 as 
dependent variables and also included a measure of the interest rate as 
the opportunity cost of holding money. Meltzer's results indicated that 
wealth was superior to both current income and permanent income. When 
both wealth and income were included in the equation, the income 
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variable appeared to play no s ignificant role in explaining the 
v ariation in money demand, whereas the wealth variable maintained the 
same significance in all tests. Meltzer a l so found that the elasticity 
of narrow money (M1) with respect to his measure of wealth to be close 
to one. This, of course, was in contrast to Friedman's finding of an 
e lasticity of M2 with respect t o permanent income of 1.81. Meltzer 
argued that Friedman's use of broad money (M2) and the absence of an 
interest rate from his equation were responsible for his high estimate 
of income elasticity. 
Meltzer's results were supported in further tests carried out by 
Brunner and Meltzer [10]. Their study involved comparisons of the 
predictions of measured velocity derived from various formulations of 
the demand for money. Their findings sugges ted that income appeared to 
play a much smaller role than wealth while the test on nonhuman we a lth 
versus permanent income yield less certain results. They concluded that 
nonhuman wealth was found to be slightly superior to perma nent income 
and far more superior than current income in explaining variations in 
the demand for money. 
Laidler (53], using year-to-year changes in data, rather than their 
annual level, compared the explanatory power of the alternative money 
d ema nd functions. The money demand functions tested by Laidler were ( 1 ) 
a Keynesian specification with current income, (2) a Friedman-type 
permanent income specification, (3) an equation with nonhuman wealth 
defined as the transitory income (measured income minus permanent 
income), plus a constant fraction (marginal propensity to save) of 
permanent income. A short rate of interest was included and both M1 and 
M2 definitions of money were used as the dependent variable. Laidler's 
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results, using data for the 1892-1960 time span, suggested both wealth 
and permanent income appeared to be able to explain more of the 
variation in the money balances than did the current income hypothesis. 
So far, this section has concentrated on the studies that have used 
annual data rather than quarterly data. Heller [44] and Goldfeld [35] 
[36], using quarterly data, found contrasting results. Heller tested 
the explanatory power of measured income and wealth in an alternative 
money demand formul ation. Both M1 and M2 were specified as dependent 
variables in equations that included income and the rate of interest, 
wealth and the rate of interest, or both income and wealth and the rate 
of interest. Measured income and wealth were both reported to be 
significantly different from zero in all equations when only one of 
these variables was used. However, when both we re included in the same 
equation, only one retained its significance: measured income in the M1 
equation and wealth in M2 equation. Heller interpreted his results as 
the evidence that demand deposits and time deposits are demanded for 
different reasons, cash and demand deposits for transactions motives and 
time deposits for the speculative or precautionary motive. 
Additional evidence using quarterly data was presented by Goldfeld 
[35]. Using a log-linear model derived from a partial adjustment 
hypothesis, he compared the relative explanatory power of income, net 
worth and change in net worth in explaining holdings of money defined by 
M1. He concluded that, "at least for quarterly data, use of an income 
variable in the demand for money equation seems eminently sensible" (p. 
615). He also argued that the absence of an income variable reduced the 
estimated speed of adjustment to a very low figure. In addition, the 
performance of Goldfeld's wealth equation in dynamic simulations was far 
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inferior to that of his measured income equation. With respect to the 
change {n net worth, the results were mixed. When income and the change 
in net worth were both included in the demand for money equation, both 
reported to be statistically significant and the change in net worth had 
indeed slightly improved the explanatory power of the original equation. 
However, the inclusion of this variable worsened its predictive ability. 
Goldfeld then argued " ••• the original equat ion is still to be 
pref erred on its ex post performance" [p. 615]. 
In 1973, Goldfeld's [35] equation, despite reporting di fferent 
results from those of the earlier studi es, became the standard 
formulation of the demand for money. But starting in 1974, forecasts 
from his equation began to overpredict real money balances. Simulation 
of Goldfeld's equation reported a cumulative error for the 1974 :1 to 
1976:2 time period of almost nine percent. Go l dfeld [36] and Benjami n 
Friedman [271 i nvestigated the contribution of wealth in order to 
correct the equation difficiency. Goldfeld found that this change , 
substituting wealth for income, did not help in dynamic forecasting over 
the 1974-1976 time period. Benj amin Friedman found that when weal th 
replaced current income in the Goldfeld equation, the estimated coeff i-
cient on the lagged dependent vari able became very large, i mplying a 
long adjustment lag. 
Goldfeld [35], in his model, used real GNP as a proxy f or 
transactions. His choice of real GN~ has come under criticism since. 
GNP ignores transact ions in financial assets and existing goods. 
Economists proposed two alternatives to GNP: (1) To use bank debits as 
a scale variable, and (2) to use the level of bank loans as a scale 
variable, e.g., Scadding and Judd [72]. Empirical results using these 
two alternatives for GNP implied that real GNP works as well as any 
o ther transaction variable, and business loans were either significant 
[36] or had the wr ong (negative) sign [24]. 
The Stability of the Money Demand Function 
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The question of whether the demand function for money is stable 
r ema ins as one of the most important issues in contemporary monetary 
theory. Scadding and Judd (71] argued that "what is being sought in a 
stable demand function is a set of necessary conditions for money to 
exert a predictable influence on the economy so that the central bank's 
control of the money supply can be a useful instrument of economic 
policy" (p. 993). 
The stability of any empirical function depends upon the variables 
included in that function and, likewise, the criteria for choosing the 
appropriate definition of some variables, has been the stability of the 
demand function for that monetary measure. By and large, empirical 
investigation prior to 1973 showed that a stable demand function for 
money did indeed exist [ 3 5] [42]. 
In 1973, Goldfeld's equation, became the standard formulation. 
Forecasting outside the sample period, Goldfeld's equation s howed no 
systematic error in such forecasts up to 1973. But, starting in 1974, 
forecasts from this equation began to overpredict real money balances. 
Dynamic simulations showed an error of nearly nine percent from 
1974:1 to 1976:2. The monetary equations in the Federal Reserve Board's 
FMP Model gave similar results [72]. In light of this evidence, some 
economists argued that the d emand for money had shifted down or the 
demand for money had become unstable. 
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If there were a s hift in the dema nd fo r money, some economists [7~] 
[46] associated the timing of this s h ift to a number of importa nt 
financial and monetary deve lopments . These include changes in 
r egulations concerning interest rate ceilings on the deposits of 
commercial banks, innovation in short-term financial markets and 
increase s in the rate of inflation and interest rates c ompared wi th 
previous years. 
Evidence for the contributions of regulatory changes to the 1973-
1976 money demand shift is rather scarce. However, Scad ding and Judd 
[72, p. 998], based on unpublished Federal Reserve Board Staff Studies 
[6 8 ], [69], argued that the evidence suggests that the regulatory 
changes cannot by themselves explain the shift. 
Discussion of the role of financial innovation concentrated mostl y 
on the demand for money by firms, particularly on their demand for 
d emand deposits. Two classes of innovation were distinguished here. 
First, the security repurchase agreement (RP), which involves the sale 
of a security with an agreement to repurchase the security at a 
specified future date and at a price which includes the accumulated 
interest. The risk in the RP market, for both parties, is assumed to be 
very low since the transactions are made for short maturities (mostly 
overnight) and because the transactions involve a high quali ty security 
which serves as collateral. The second class of t hese financi al 
innovations was the cash conce ntr ati o n account. These accounts involve 
the transfer of excess cash balances from local banks to regional or 
money-center banks. These sorts of accounts reduced the size of 
transactions balances a corpo ration needed since cash inflows a t one 
local account could be balanced agains t cash outflows at another local 
a ccount ·(72, p. 999]. 
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The empirical investigations on the impact of financial innovation 
on the demand for money can also be divided into two classes. The first 
class argues that the transactions cost between money and RPs are so low 
that RPs are effectively money. In this view, the solution, theref ore, 
was to redefine M1 to include RPs (34] [78] [82]. The second class of 
investigations argues that the increased use of RPs has lowered transac-
tions costs, but not so much that they should actually be included in 
the definition of M1. Instead, this class of economists argued that the 
shift in money demand could be removed by including the previous peak 
interest rates or income as proxies for reductions in transactions costs 
caused by financial innovation [70]. 
The results obtained by Garcia and Pak [34] indicated the demand 
for money is relatively more stable over 1974-1976 when the dependent 
variable includes RP than when it does not. While their estimated 
coefficients on income and the lagged dependent variable was not 
substantially different from those of Goldfeld, they found the root-
mean-square error during 1974:1-1976:2 was reduced by 76 percent by 
including RPs in the money definition. 
The empirical investigations using ratchet variables as proxies to 
re.flect reductions in transactions costs also lend support to the view 
that this variable can help to account for the money demand shift. 
Ratchets on income and interest rate were used by Goldfeld [35] and 
rendered favorable results. The income-ratchet variable defined as the 
ratio of GNP to previous p e ak GNP when entered into the standard 
equation obtained a positive significant coefficient. In addition, the 
root-mean-square for M1 reduced from 48 p ercent to 3.1 p ercent. The 
interest rate ratchet defined as the previous peak rate on commercial 
paper when used both obtained a significantly negative coeff icient and 
improved the simulations. When Goldfeld entered both of t hese ratchet 
variables with the marginal bank debits in his original equation he 
f ound the root-mean-square went down to two percent and the error in 
1976:2 went down to 4.1 percent, a reduction of almost 6 0 percent 
compared to his original equation. 
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Scadding and Judd [72, p. 1002] have argued that, in order to 
decide which one of the above approaches is appropriate, one needs to 
have direct institutional evidence on the leve l of the transactions 
costs in the RP market, such as the degree of substituta bility of RPs 
for demand deposits. Based on an unpublished investigation by Porter 
and Mauskopf [68), which provid es the only estimate on transactions 
costs in the RP market, they argued the costs of going i n and out of RPs 
are not so low and RPs probably do not dominate demand deposits. 
According to Scadding and Judd, this suggests that ratchet variables are 
to be preferred ove r adding RPs to M1. This conclusion can be further 
supported using Porter and Simpson's [69, p. 220] findi ngs. They have 
argued that, for RP s to dominate demand deposi ts, the RP market must be 
active late in the day when firms know the amount of demand deposit 
balances needed to cover their transactions. However, they found mos t 
RP activity takes place in the morning. Nevertheless, mos t banks will 
not a l low RPs to be reversed i n the same day to meet unexpected cash 
needs [72, p. 1003). 
However, despite the evidence supporting the ratchet variable 
formulation, any conclusion that can be drawn must be regarded as highly 
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tentative. First, although the ratchet variable specification improved 
the fo recas ting ability of the original Goldfeld equation, it did not do 
so well in the ten years prior to 1974. This issue was addressed by 
Goldfeld (35] in simul ations of his standard M1 equation. Second, other 
industrialized countries• money demand equations did not shift despite 
the fact that the 1973-74 high interest rate experience was worldwide. 
With the exception of Canada, foreign evidence does not suggest any 
instability of money demand after 1973, even though the rate of 
inflation and rates of interest abroad were similar to those in the u.s. 
(72]. Moreover, Boughton [7) attributed the shift in Canadian demand 
for M1 not to financial innovation, but to the move by the Canadian 
Monetary Authority in 1974 to a more flexible exchange rate system. 
Summary 
It was argued that almost all of the time series studies of the 
demand for money have used nominal interest rates, thus ignoring the 
effects of the income tax. Changes in tax rates alter the relative 
net-of-tax yields on different assets and 1 of course, the yields 
relative to cash. The consequences of ignoring tax changes results in 
an biased estimate of pure income and interest elasticities of demand 
for money. This is most obvious since the yield on money is untaxed 
while the net yields on all other assets fall as income and the marginal 
tax rate rise. 
With regard to the relevant opportunity cost of holding money, 
although the majority of the studies favor the use of a short-term 
interest rate, the final judgment must await pendi ng additional 
investigation, especially on the term structure of interest rates. 
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Using annual data, the evidence overwhelming points to the 
s upe riority of nonhuman wealth or permanent income over current income. 
Nevertheless, the time series studies using quarterly data indicated 
that current income was found to be the most appropriate scale variable. 
This conclusion was drawn based on the forecasting ability of the 
various formulations. 
This review found no reason to suspect any ins tability in the 
d emand for money for the pre-1973 period. However, the most likely 
cause of the observed instability in the demand for money after 1973 was 
found to be innovations in financial management. 
This review also found that none of the alternative empirical 
specifications a ppeared to be superior to Goldf eld ' s equation in the 
sense of reducing the latter's post-1973 overprediction. 
CHAP'fER III 
MODEL SPECIFICATION AND ECONOMETRIC ANAL YSIS 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the procedures used in 
analyzing the empirical data. This i ncludes a discussion of the 
theoretical models of the demand for money, specification of the 
equations, statement of the hypotheses, econometric testing procedures, 
a nd the simultaneity and identification issues relating to the demand 
for money. 
Theoretical Work 
Baumol [4] and Tobin [80] use an inventory theoretic technique to 
model the transaction demand for money. Baumel's use of an inventory 
approach to the analysis of the demand for money has considerable 
intuitive appe a l . Commodity inventories a re held to bridge the g a p 
between production and sales, money to bridge the g ap between receipts 
and expenditures. Like the holders of inventories, holders of money are 
faced with the conflict between being caught short and the opportunity 
to earn some returns on alternative assets. 
In its simplest form, the inventory model assumes only two stores 
of value, money with zero nominal rate of interest and an alternative 
interest-bearing asset, e.g., bonds. The model assumes a cost of 
transacting between the two alternative assets, i.e., brokerage fees, 
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and a lack of synchronization betwee n receipts and expenditures. The 
key element in the model is the interest rate differential between bonds 
and money that creates an interest opportunity cost of holding money. 
In this context, smaller money balances, on the average, are associated 
wi th high interes t earnings or lower interest costs, but at the expense 
of higher transaction costs. Individuals are assumed to act so as to 
maximize interest earnings on the interest earning asset, net of 
transaction costs. Therefore, the average optimal real balances are 
determined by equality of the competing costs at the margin. 
Mathematically, it can be shown that the implied average real 
balances are determined by the well-known square root formula, or: 
~d- (~~)1/2 ( 1 ) 
where T a scale variable measuring transactions level 
b fixed brokerage fee, cost of transaction 
i the rate of interest 
optimal nominal balances. 
Transforming this equation into logarithmic form gives: 
LnMd = 1/2 Ln b + 1/2 Ln T- 1/2 Ln 2i (2) 
The money demand elasticities are one-half with respect to 
transactions level and the cost of transactions, and negative one-half 
with respect to the interest rate on the earning asset. 
The simple Baumel model has been improved and enhanced to include 
some additional assets and to account for some f · o ~ts shortcomings. In 
particular, Feige and Pa rkin (25] included commodity stocks as an 
additional alternative store of value. Th dd' · e a 1t1on of commodity stocks 
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into the model then required incorporation of a new cost of transacting 
for purchases of commodities with money and a nominal rate of interest 
for the commodity stores. The expected rate of inflation less the rate 
of depreciation and storage cost was taken as the relevant return for 
the commodity stores. According to this extended model, an increase in 
the expected rate of inflation raises the return on commodities and, 
therefore, reduces money ho ldings even if the nominal rate on the 
earning asset is held constant. 
Yet, in another attempt to enhance the simple inventory model, 
Miller and Orr [59] applied the inventory approach to the demand for 
money in a stochastic context. While concentrating primarily on the 
firm's demand for money, they argued that a firm's net cash flow from 
receipts and expenditures was generated by a trendless random walk and, 
therefore, is entirely random. The firm's behavior in this framework is 
characterized by a two-parameter control limit policy. According to 
this inventory rule, the cash balance is allowed to fluctuate freely 
until it reaches either a predetermined lower bound or an upper bound. 
The firm then reacts with the appropriate portfolio transfer to restore 
the balance to a selected level of cash. 
An important aspect of the stochastic inventory model is that the 
scale variable turns out to be the variance of daily net cash flow, with 
an·elasticity of one-third. Their formulation also shows a negative 
interest rate effect with an elasticity of negative one-third and a 
positive effect of transaction costs with an elasticity of positive 
one-third. Therefore, the differences between the Miller and Orr 
elasticities and the Baumel elasticities involve a substitution of 
one-third for one-half. 
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However, subsequent extensions of the model, in particular by 
Brunner arid Meltzer [9], show that under certain conditions the 
equation's elasticity coefficient does not take fixed values. The 
conditions include: the presence of different transfer costs into as 
opposed to out of money and also the presence of positive cash flows 
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from sales as well as bond transfer. Under this condition, total money 
holdings, which are equal to the sum of amounts from both sources, 
depend on transaction levels, the interest rate, and all transfer costs. 
However, they show that, when all transfer costs exceed zero, the 
elasticity coefficients do not take fixed values. Therefore, while 
leaving the original variables intact, their analysis suggests that the 
elasticity values are an econometric question. 
The Tax Rate and the Demand for Money 
Using the inventory theoretic model as the point of departure, this 
section presents an analysis of the implications of including the tax 
variable in the demand for money. More specifically, first, the effects 
of inclusion of the tax rate on the arguments of the money demand 
equation--such as interest rates--are discussed, and second, an analysis 
of the nature of the relationship between changes in the tax rate and 
the subsequent changes in the optimal money holding is presented. 
With regard to the first issue, the key element in the inventory 
approach to the transactions demand for money is the interest rate 
differential between bonds and money that creates an opportunity cost of 
holding money. Based on this model, individuals are assumed to act so 
as to maximize interest earnings on the interest earning asset, net of 
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transaction costs. This implies that the average optimal real balances 
are determined by equating the competing costs at the margin. 
In a country with proportional income taxes at rate~, for which 
i nteres t receipts are taxable, the marginal interest cost of holding 
money is the after-tax rate of interest. This is obvious since the 
yield on money is untaxed while the net yield on all other assets falls 
as the marginal tax rate rises, thereby, reducing the yields on differ-
e nt assets relative to cash. This implies that it is the after-tax 
rate of interest that is relevant for individual constraints and there-
fore determines behavior. 
The conclusion, therefore, follows that a fundamental aspect of 
taxes that has not generally been observed in empirical work on the 
topic is the need to work directly with after-tax rates of interest. 
This implies that one has to work with a net interest money demand 
s pecification. 
Given the fact that the appropriate opportunity cost of holding 
money is the after-tax rate of interest, a net interest money demand 
equation is used to address the second question--the nature of the 
relationship between changes in the tax rate and the subsequent changes 
in the optimal money holding. 
Consider the following demand for money equation expressed in terms 
of the net interest rate and an income variable: 
where rN ~ r(1-t), r = nominal rate of interest, t =marginal tax rate, 
Y ~ scale variable and Md = optimal demand for money. In this context, 






However, drN/dt = -r, therefore 
dMd 
dt 
= -r 0 
Since dMdjdrN is negative, the conclusion follows that dMd /dt is 
positive, or as tax rate increases, so does the transaction demand for 
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money. This positive relationship between the tax rate and the optimal 
demand for money is due to the fact that the true opportunity cost of 
holding money--net rate of interest--and the tax rate are inversely 
related. 
In addition to this direct relationship between the tax rate and 
the opportunity cost of holding money, there also exists another equally 
important but less obvious relationship between taxation and the degree 
of risk-taking known as the risk-sharing factor. This is t he Damar-
Musgrave [21] effect. The nature of the relationship is argued to be 
indirect, through the effects of taxation on risk taking. This analysis 
crucially depends upon the investor's ability to offset losses. If 
losses cannot be offset, meaning capital losses are not tax deductible, 
then the investor carries the entire burden of risk. In this case, the 
tax reduces the yield but leaves the risk unchanged. This, in turn, 
reduces the compensation per unit of risk taking, as defined by the 
ratio of yield over risk. Risk-taking becomes less attractive and there 
is some incentive on the part of the investor to hold more money or take 
less risk. This is the substitution effect of taxation on risk-taking. 
Further, the tax also reduces the interest income and to restore it more 
risk is taken, i.e., the proportion of total assets held in riskless 
asset (or money) is reduced. This is known as the income effect of 
taxation on risk-taking. The final effect in this case is ambiguous, 
depending upon which of the two opposing forces prevail. 
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With the full loss offset provision, imposition of taxa tion on 
i nterest income reduces both yiel d and risk by the same proportion, 
therefore leaving no incentives to take less risk as the substitution 
effect of taxation on risk-taking disappears. However, to compensate 
for the loss of interest income, more risk is taken by investing more in 
risky assets at the expense of hol ding less money. This suggests that 
if a complete offset of losses is possible then there exist s an inverse 
relationship between the tax rate and the demand for money. This is, of 
course, the risk-sharing factor. 
As is obvious, assuming full loss offset is in effect, the final 
effect of the tax rate on the demand for money depends upon which of 
these two opposing forces--the direct substitution effect or the 
indirect risk-s haring effect--dominates. If the direct substitution 
effect outweighs the indirect risk-sharing effect, then one e xpe c t s to 
get a positive relationship betwe en the tax rate and the demand for 
money. If the risk-sharing effect is the dominant effect , then an 
inverse conclusion is expected. Given the ambiguous nature of the final 
effect, this study remains uncertain about the relationship and make s i t 
an empirical q ue s tion . In order to address this issue and to empiri cal-
ly identify the d omi nant factor amongst the two opposing forces, con-
sider the following equation: 
Ln Md = Ln a + B1 Ln r ( 1-t) + B2 Ln Y + E:j_ 
where r(1-t) = the net rate of interest, Y = the scale variable and 
Md real demand for money. 
This equation e xplicitly accounts for the substitution effect s ince 
the tax rate is incorporated i nto the equation only through its eff ect 
on the opportunity cost of holding money. In order to include the 
38 
risk-sharing factor into this equation, it is adjusted to give: 
Ln Md = Ln a + B1 Ln r(1-t) + B2 Ln Y + B3 Ln (1-t) + £i 
In this context, the net rate of interest or r( 1-t) captures the 
direct substitution effect--as suggested by the inventory theoretic 
model--and (1-t) picks up any residual effect or the risk-sharing 
effect, as suggested by Domar-Musgrave and Tobin. In order to identify 
the dominant effect, this equation can be expanded to give: 
where B* = B1 + B3. 4 
a Md 
Based on Demar-Musgrave and Tobin, B3 > 0, since ~ < 0 or 
a Md 
d( 1-t) > 0. It is also expected that B1 carries a negative sign. In 
this framework, then, B4; 0, for B3 ~ B1• In other words: 
1. If B4 is positive, then B3 > B1, or the risk-sharing effect 
outweighs the substitution effect. 
2. If B4 is negative, then the substitution effect is the 
dominant factor. 
3. If B4 = 0, then the two opposing effects are offsetting. 
Model Specification 
An Aggregate Demand for Money 
A conventional formulation of the money demand function based on 
the transaction demand for money has real money balances related to the 
interest rate on the relevant substitute assets and some measure of 
economic activity, such as income or wealth. Thus: 
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Ln a + B1 Ln r + B2 Ln Y (3) 
or 
Ln Md = Ln K + -yR + u Ln Y (4) 
Equations (3) and (4) are different in the sense that (3) inc~udes 
the logarithms of interest rates rather than the interest rates them-
selves. Inclusion of the logarithms of interest rates would imply that 
t.he corresponding regression coefficients are interest elasticities. 
This would assume that elasticities are the same at all levels of 
interest rates. 
Equation (4), however, implicitly assumes that the absolute rather 
than percentage change in interest rates is what rna tters for the demand 
for money (31, p. 264]. This, of course, means that whether interest 
rates are high or low , a one-percentage point change in interest rate 
produces the same percentage change, in the opposite direction, in the 
quantity of money demanded and, therefore, assumes that slopes rather 
than elasticities are the same at all levels of interest rates. 
Friedman and Schwartz [31, p. 266], argued that it is more 
appropriate to use a constant slope (semilog) rather than constant 
elasticity (log-linear) specification on the grounds that a doubling of 
an interest rate of one percent is not as much of a stimul us to r educe 
cash balances as is a doubling of an interest rate of ten percent. 
Therefore, constant elasticity should be ruled out. Friedman and 
Schwartz's estimation of semilog equation provided favorable results. 
Despite their finding, the question regarding the appropriate specifica-
tion requires a thorough empirical analysis before a firm conclusion can 
be drawn. 
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Other approaches toward the demand for money emphasize speculative 
or utility analysis in addition to the transaction motive, for instance 
'i'obin [81] and Patinkin [63]. Although these approaches lead to more 
c omplicated specifications of the demand for money, they are broadly 
consistent with the general form of equation (3). Goldfeld [35], using 
q uarterly data, made several modifications to this basic equation. 
Using equation (3), he introduced the concept of desired, as opposed to 
actual, money balances and specified a partial adjustment mechanism by 
including a lagged, as well as current, dependent variable and came up 
with an equation in the following form: 
Ln Mt Y Ln a + Y B1 Ln RCP + Y B2 Ln RTD (5) 
+ Y B3 Ln Y + ( 1- y) Ln Mt_1 
Where Mt = real money balances 
Y = real GNP 
RCP the rate on commercial paper 
RTD = the rate on time deposits 
Y = the speed of adjustment. This measures the rate at which 
adjustments are made to bring actual money holding i n line with 
the desired level. 
Using equation (5) and applying the marginal income tax rates, ~, 
the nominal interest rates in equation (5) can be transformed to the net 
interest rates, i.e., interest rates after taxes, in the following 
manner: 1 
1The Goldfeld model is used as the point of departure for the 
purpose of model specification. Whether this model is the best specifi-
cation is subject to debate. This specification is tested against some 
alternative models and resul ts are reported in Chapter VI. 
41 
Ln Mt yT Ln a+ yT B1T Ln [RCP {1-t)] (6) 
+ {1-Y)T Ln Mt_1 • 
Wh e re superscript T denotes the estimated coefficient for the tax-
adjusted equation. The estimated coefficient for B1T and B2T then would 
provide the short-run elasticity of the demand for money with respect to 
the net rates of interest. 
In the context of equation (6), the long-run elasticity of demand 
for money with respect to the interest rate variables is influenced by 
two factors: first, variations in the nominal interest rate as well as 
income; second, variation in the tax rate. This is the purpose of this 
dissertation, then, to analyze the differences between these estimates 
and those of the conventional formulation. 
Two rates of interest are included in the model, RCP to represent 
the market rate of return on risky assets and RTD to account for the 
yield on riskless assets. Specifying a demand for money equation in 
terms of the bond rate of interest alone results in confining the model 
with the allocation of wealth between only risky assets (bond) and 
riskless liquid assets, in general. The purpose for inclusion of RTD is 
to be able to account for the division of liquid assets between money, 
def·ined as means of payment and risk-free assets which yield a nominal 
return but are not generally accepted as a medium of exchange, e.g., 
savings deposits, since it is the former which is most generally defined 
as money and not the latter. 
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Household Demand f o r Money 
In order to formulate a testable specif ication for the household 
demand for money, Baumel's inventory theoretic framework is used as the 
point of departure. Based on this model, average optimal real cash 
balances are determined by the equality of the competing costs at the 
margin. The cost of holding money for the household sector should be 
represented not by the nominal rate of interest but rather by t his rate 
net of taxes. 
With regard to the cost of transacting between interest bearing 
assets and money in the case of the househol d sector, these costs are 
"large ly nonpecuniary" and therefore in many cases unobservable. 'i'he 
nonpecuniary nature of these costs arises from the fact that they are 
largely intangible. For instance, in the case of the household, these 
costs are mostly defined to include such elements as time for such 
things as more frequent trips to the bank and t he time required to 
balance the checkbook. However, it is not the nonpecuniary nature of 
these costs which is solely important, but rather the fact that these 
costs are not tax-deductible. That is, while t he cost of holding money 
should be adjusted for the marginal tax rate, no such adjustment can be 
made to the costs of holding interest bearing liquid assets or, in 
general, to the costs of transacting between the alternative asse ts (50, 
P• 684]. Otherwise, the income t ax is irrelevant, since it reduces at 
the margin both the costs and returns by the same proportion, therefore 
leaving the optimal money balances unchanged.2 
2For a complete discussion, the reader should see Ira P. Kaminov, 
"The Household Demand for Money," Journal of Finance, 24 (September 
1969) 1 679-696. 
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The second aspect of the transaction costs is that they are 
unobservable. For the purpose of empirical tests, this dissertation 
assume s that these costs are institutionally fixed. 
Since the Goldfeld [35] model is used as the point of departure and 
of contrast for the results to be presented for the aggregate demand for 
money equation, this dissertation used a model that i s similar to the 
one used by Goldfeld to incorporate the ideas presented for the house-
hold money demand equation. 
Goldfeld found that the same type of specification used for 
aggregated money demand worked equally well for the household sector. 
In light of this finding, the household demand for money is specified as 
follows: 3 
Ln M1Ht = Ln a+ B1 Ln CONSt + B2 Ln RCP~ + B3 Ln RTD~ (7} 
+ B4 Ln M1 Ht-1 
Where M1H = households' total holding of currency and demand deposits, 
real consumption expenditures at time t, RTDf = rate on time 
deposit after adjusted for taxation, RCPT = after-tax rate of interest 
t 
of commercial paper, and M1Ht-1 = M1H lagged one quarter. 
This equation is fitted to empirical observations of variables, and 
the results are compared with the non-tax specification • 
. 3one can alternatively specify a s emi-log model. Since Goldfeld's 
equation is used for the aggregate model, the same formulation is used 
for the house hold sector. If the tests in Chapter VI result in 
superiority of semi-log or any other fo rmulation over Goldfeld's, then 
that specification will be used to replace Goldfeld's equation for both 
the aggregate and household sectors. 
Business Demand for Money 
Before describing the model to be used for this sector, it is 
helpful to start with the recognition that the inventory theory has 
different implications for the busines s and household sectors. 
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Kaminov [SO] argues that the business sector's responsiveness to 
the short-term rate of interest appears to be very sluggish. He uses 
evidence reported by the National Industrial Conference Board. This 
indicates that a considerable amount of investment in fixed plant must 
be made by corporations before they can actually economize on money 
balances. These expenses include such elements as fixed hiring costs to 
increase the staf fs of comptrollers• offices, the cost of operating new 
accounting systems and the cost of retraining current employees in money 
economizing techniques. Based on these results, he concludes that for 
firms to engage in significant cash economizing it is necessary that 
they be convinced that a high short-term interest rate will prevail for 
long periods of time [p. 684]. 
This view was supported by James Dussenberry [23]. According to 
him, a five-year moving average of past short-term interest rates is a 
good candidate to measure the opportunity cost of money in the case of 
the corporate demand for money. 
The foregoing discussion, therefore, suggests that there may be a 
very sluggish response to changes in the short-term interest rate in the 
case of the business demand for money. 
Nevertheless, for the purpose of this dissertation, the most 
important aspect of the business demand f o r money is the transactions 
cost. In the case of the household sector, the transactions costs are 
of a nonpecuniary nature and, therefore, are not tax deductible. While 
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this argument is completely in line for household demand for money, it 
does not seem to be as appealing in the case of the business sector. 
For corporations, the costs of cash economizing are largely financial 
cos ts and, therefore, tax deductible. This, of course, implies that the 
income tax would reduce both the marginal costs and returns to cash 
economizing by the same proportion and, therefore, leave money balances 
invariant with respect to the tax rate. This suggests that the tax 
variable does not belong in the business demand for money; and if the 
tax variable is indeed included as an explanatory variable it would not 
enhance the explanatory power of the equation.4 
4This point can be shown by the following cost function. 
Total Cost = _b_:.(_1_-_t..:..)_·T~ + _r_(_1_-_t..:....)_•c_ 
c 2 
Where c = optimal cash holdings. 
function involves: 
The minimization of the total cost 
or 
d (total cost) 
de 
-b(1-t)•T r(1-t) 







2b(1-t) 0 T 
r ( 1-t) 
I 2b(1-t)•T c = 
r( 1-t) 
c I b(1-t)•T 
2 
-
2r ( 1-t) 
c2 2 
= 0 
It is obvious that the term ( 1-t) cancels, therefore leaving the firm • s 
demand for money invariant with respect to the tax rate. 
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Based on the conventional empirical models [5] [75] (85) [60] [62] 
and using Goldfeld 1 s specification as the point of departure, the 
following equation is formulated:5 
Ln M1B Ln a+ B1 Ln SALEt + B2 Ln RCP~ + ( 1 0) 
+ B3 Ln M1Bt-1 
Where M1Bt =business holdings of demand deposits and currency, SALEt = 
manufacturing and trade sales, as a proxy for the transactions variable, 
RCPT = interest rate of commercial paper after adjusting for tax rate, 
t 
and M1Bt-l = M1B lagged one quarter. 
This specification provides a direct comparison with the non-tax 
specification which appears as 
Ln M1Bt = Ln 1 + B1 Ln SALEt + B2 Ln RCPt + B3 Ln M1Bt-l (11) 
These two equations are fitted to empirical observations of 
variables and the results are used to investigate the empirical 
dimension of incorporating income taxation into the business demand for 
money. 
Statement of Hypothesis 
The discussion presented, suggests that earlier empirical works on 
the topic have misspecified the demand for money equation. The 
misspecification arises from the fact that, by using the nominal rate of 
interest as the proxy for the opportunity cost of holding money, the 
5Although inventory theory generated testable specifications, the 
empirical work on the topic provided no consensus as to what the 
relevant variables are. For instance, Ben-Zion (5] and Sprenkle (7 5 ] 
used nominal sales while Whalen [83) used a ratio of sales to total 
assets as the proper transactions leveL With respect to the rate of 
interest, Ben-Zion [5] used the cost of capital as a proxy for interest 
rate while Miller and Orr [60] used a long-term rate. Finally, the 
concept of transaction cost was omitted in most of the empirical work 
with the exception of Sprenkle [75] and Orr [62]. 
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earlier work s have ignored: (a) the role of the income tax structure 
and the point that interest receipts are taxable, and (b) the effect of 
the income taxation on optimal bond holding as suggested by Tobin [81] 
a nd others [ 2 1 ] • 
In the area of the demand for money, like any other area of 
r esearch, economic theory should be used as a guide toward identifying 
the most relevant choice of variables. The point that the investor 
compensates for the taxation on investment income by increasing holdings 
of the risky asset is well established if one considers the effect of 
taxation on the portfolio selection decisions of expected utility 
maximizing investors. This implies that the imposition of income taxes 
alters the optimal asset combination through its effect on risk and 
yield of risky investment, as well as its effect on the true opportunity 
cost; in a country with income taxes, for which interest receipts are 
taxable, i t is the after-tax r ate of interest that enters individual 
constraints and de termines behavior. 
In the case of the household sector, the asymmetry between the 
treatment of the costs and returns by the tax laws provides the 
theoretical justification for including the tax variable in the demand 
for money. This s uggests that for this sector the null hypothesis (Ho) 
can be stated as: The tax-adjusted specification is the true model 
while the alternative hypothesis (H1 ) is: The non-tax specification is 
the true model. 
In the case of the business demand for money, inventory theory 
suggests the opposite. For corporations, the income tax reduce both the 
marginal cost and marginal returns to cas h economizing by the same 
proportion, thus leaving money balances invariant with respect to the 
tax rate. In light of this discussion, for business demand for money, 
the null hypothesis (Ho) is stated as the non-tax specification is the 
true model, while the alternative hypothesis (H1) is that tax-adjusted 
specification is true model. 
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For the aggregated demand for money equation, two testable specifi-
cations were formulated. According to Tobin [8 1], the imposition of a 
tax, t, levied on interest income and capital gains, with a complete 
loss offset provision in effect, would reduce the e xpected return and 
the risk , per dollar of consols, by the same p r oport i on. As a result of 
this, the opportunity locus of risk and expected return remains con-
stant. However, the imposition of taxation causes the risk-consol line 
to rotate to the left. This implies, that the i ndividual's income, how-
ever, dec l ines; and to restore it the demand for money at any market 
rate of interest is reduced. 
The following discussion, therefore, suggests a demand for money 
specified in terms of nominal rate of interes t will overestimate the 
actual money holding. In light of this argument, the null hypothesis 
(Ho) in the case of aggrega ted demand is specified as: The non-tax 
specification is the true model, while the alternative hypothesis (H1 ) 
is: The tax-ad j usted specifica tion is the true model. 
Income Tax and the Elasticity Estimates 
All of the time series studies of the demand for money use the 
observed market interest rate, and thus have ignored the effects of the 
income taxation. In a country with income taxes, changes in tax rates 
alter the relative net of tax yields on different assets and , more 
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i mportantly, the yields relative to cash. Since the yield on money is 
untaxed while the net yields on all other assets fall as income and the 
margi nal tax rate rise, ignoring tax changes results in an overestima-
tion of pur e income and interest elasticities of the demand for money. 
The overestimation of pure income and interest elasticities of the 
demand for money arises from t he fact that the earlier empirical works 
on the topic have largely misspecified the money demand equation. The 
two most common types of misspecification occur when (1) a relevant 
variab le is omitted from the regression, and (2) an irrelevant variable 
is added to the equation. The former has occurred in the empirical 
investigations of the demand for money. 
In order to investigate the effects of taxes on the income and 
interest elas ticities of the demand for money consider the following two 
models (48, pp. 187]: 
Yi = X1 B* + E:* 
1 i 
( 1 6) 
( 1 7) 
where X1 is an NXK matrix of independent variable observations and X2 i s 
an NX1 column vector of omitted independent variable observations. As-
s ume that the true model is given by equation (16), whi l e the regre ssion 
model is given by equation (17). 
B* 
1 
The B* is estimated as 
1 
Substituting for Yi as defined by equation (16) into equat ion {17) 






"' B* ( 1 9) 
1 
Taking the expectation of equation (19) renders 
(20) 
since E(Ei) = 0, given the assumptions of the classical linear model. 
From equation (9) it can be seen that since there is no reason a 
A 
priori that the second term equals to zero, the estimated value of Bi 
from the misspecified equation, yields a biased estimate of B1. In 
the case where the equation is in logarithm form, the estimated value of 
B* is interpreted as the elasticity of Y with respect to the independent 
1 
variables. Therefore, the foregoing conclusion suggests that, when 
working with log-linear specification, omission of a relevant va riable 
yields biased estimates of the true elasticities. 
It can be recalled that the conventional demand for money was 
adjus ted for the tax-variable by including one minus the marginal tax 
rate rather than the marginal tax rate in the equation; accordingly, the 
X2 ·variable in equation (20) refers to (1-t). According to equation 
(20), the direction of bias depends upon the estimated slope coeffi-
cients associated with the regression of the omitted variable on all in-
eluded variables, as well as the sign of the coefficient B2 from the 
true model. The relationship between the omitted variable and all other 
included variables can be captured by the following regression model: 
5 1 
Ln (1-t) = c 0 + c1 Ln r + c2 Ln Y + £ 




E (B*) = 1 B1 + c, B2 
(:).1 ) 
_c2_ 
With respect to the direction of bias for income elasticity, it is clear 
that an increase in the tax rate results in a reduction of income. 
Consequently, one expects a positive relationship between income and 
(1-t). Therefore, for income elasticity the fol lowing relationship 
exists 
+ + + ? 
It is clear that nothing can be said about the direction of bias because 
of the ambiguity of the B2 parameter. If the substitution effect 
outweighs the risk-sharing effect, then B2 is negative and, therefore, 
the omission of the tax-variable results in an underestimation of the 
income elasticity. However, if the risk-sharing effect dominates, the 
direction of bias is reversed. It is clear that the question about the 
direction of bias is an econometric issue. 
With respect to the interest elasticity of the demand for money, 
the following relationship exists: 
+ ? 
In this case, it is also clear that no definite conclusion can be 
made with respect to the direction of bias. This is partially due to 
the fact that, theoretically, the sign of the C1 parameter, or the 
nature of the relationship between ~ and E• is not predictable. 
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The foregoing analysis therefore sugges ts that ignoring the effect 
of income taxation on the demand for money results in biased estimates 
of pure income and interest elasticities of the demand for money. The 
direction of bias, however, remains an econometric question. 
Testing Procedures 
It has been argued that the inventory theoretic model indicates the 
need to work directly with the after-tax rates of interest. For the 
purpose of model specification this in turn implies the need to work 
with a net interest money demand formulation. In this context, the 
theoretical proposition set forth is: The net interest money demand 
equation is the correct specification. 
The proposition that, in a country with income taxes, the 
appropriate opportunity cost of holding money should be represented by 
the after-tax rate of interest is theoretically plausible and realistic. 
But a theory is not judged by its plausibility, but by how well it can 
predict the actual behavior in the market place; in other words, by its 
applicability. This means, although the transactions demand for money 
implies that the correct specification is in terms of the after-tax rate 
of interest, this proposition should be tested to see whether it 
represents the true model, given the historical observation of the data. 
This is .the truth of this specification should be tested against the 
alternative formulation. The purpose of this ·section is to outline in 
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detail the statistical tests that are used to compare the tax-adjusted 
vers ion of . the demand for money agains t the conventional form, or the 
non-tax specification. 
One test of the relative abilities of the two specifications of the 
money demand equation would be to compare the sum of squared residuals. 
One can also reestimate the two equations over a shortened period and 
then compare their relative forecasting abilities over the remainder of 
the sample period. In addition to these basic tests, one can also use 
the procedure proposed by Pesaran and Deaton (P-D) [65]. Their testing 
procedure allows one to test the truth of a multivariate regression 
specification, when there exists a nonnested alternative hypothesis. 
P-O's procedure is primarily based on the theoretical work of Cox [16]. 
According to Cox, assume the hypothesis to be tested, H1, and the 
alternative, H2, is given by: 
H1: Y X B1 + U1 
H2 : Y = Z B2 + u2 
( 1 2) 
( 1 3) 
where Y is the vector of n observations on the dependent variable, u1 
and U2 are vectors of normally and independently distributed error 
terms, X and Z are matrices of observations on the independent vari-
ables, and B1 and B2 are vectors of parameters to be e stimated. 
Assume a, and a2 are the complete set of parameters under H1 and 
H2 and L1 (a, ) and L2 ( a2) represent the log likelihood functions of H1 
and H2, then the Cox statistic (T1 ) for testing H1 against H2 is given 
by: 
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where n; number of observations , P lim = the probability limit when H1 
A A l'to A il"t. 
i s true, L1 0 ; L1 (a, ) - L2 (a2) and a, and a2 = the maximum likelihood 
estimators of a, and a2 under H1 and H2• Given H1 is true, Cox shows 
that T1 is asymptotically normally distributed wi. th mean zero and 
variance V(Tl ). 
Pesaran and Deaton's technique is primarily concerned with the 
derivation of specific expressions for T1 and V(T1). To derive T1 the 
following steps should be taken: 
A "2 A 2 
1. H1 and H2 should be estimated and a,, B2~ o1 and o 2 calculated 
A2 A 2 
following the usual estimation technique where o 1 and o 2 are 
defined as the estimated residual variance from Hl and H2. 
2. 
"'2 
Let o2 1 be the estimated residual variance from the regression 
.... 
of X a, o n z. 
"2 "2 "'2 
Define a 1 o = o, + 021• 3. 
4. T1 is then 
For the derivation of V(T1 ) they argue that: 
where e1 21 is the vector of OLS residuals in the regression of e 21 (the 
" residuals from the reg ression of X B1 on Z) on x. Clearly then, 
e~ 21 e 121 is the residual sum of squares from this last regression. 
Since T1 was argued to be asymptotically normally distributed with 
mean zero and variance V(T1 ), it is obvious that, given the truth of H1 , 
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N1 = T 1/V(T1 ) 112 i s asymptotically distributed as N(0,1). Similarly, 
,.. 
one can compute T2, V2 CT2l and N2 when H2 is a ssumed to be t h e correct 
model. 
The result of t his test can be classified according to the four 
possible outcomes : 
(1) Do not reject H1 and reject H2 when IN 1 I < 1.96 and 
( 2 ) Reject H1 and do not reject Hz when /N1 I > 1. 9 6 and 
(3) Reject both H1 and H2 when IN1 I > 1.96 and /N z l > 1.96 
(4) Do not reject H1 and H2 when jN1 I < 1.96 and jN2 I < 1 .96. 
Alternatively, Davidson and MacKinnon (D-M) [18] have p roposed a simple 
method for testing model specification in the presence of an alternative 
non-nested model. Consider t he following two specificat ions: 
Ho: Y 
According to Davidson and MacKinnon, if the null hypothesis is that H0 
is the true model, then the tes t equation is: 
y = x a1 + a z B2 
where Z B2 is the predicted value for Y from est imating H1 • According 
to Davidson and MacKinnon, the true value of ~ is zero when Ho is true. 
Consequently, if the estimated value of a does not differ significantly 
fran zero, Ho would not be rejected. To test the truth of H1, however, 
one must estimate : 
" where X B1 is the predicted value of Y from estimating Ho• If the 
estimated value of a does not diff er significantly from zero, then one 
cannot reject the hypothesis that H1 is the true model. 
The the tax-adjusted demand for money equation will be tested 
against the non-tax specification using both the (P-D) and the (D-M) 
testing procedures. 
Identification and Simultaneity 
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The conventional approach toward estimating the demand for money is 
to use a least squares estimation model. This practice is justified 
only if one assumes that each of the independent variables in the model 
is uncorrelated with the error term. In other words, the use of a least 
squares regression model is warranted i f there exists a one-way causa-
tion from the independent to the dependent variable, with no direct 
feedback. In particular, the interest rate must be assumed to influence 
the real supply ~money, but the stock of money must not influence this 
variable. 
A close examination of economic theories suggests that one way 
causation from the interest rate to the real quantity of money demanded 
is not warranted and causation is not unidirectional. This, in turn, 
implies that the estimate of the coefficients derived by least squares 
regression methods is inconsistent [6, p. 280). 
The following discussion suggests the necessity of working within a 
complete structural model of demand and supply functions in which the 
demand for money equation will be estimated as one element in a multi-
equation model. The majority of the empirical work that has assumed 
s irnul tanei ty between money supply and money demand have cone luded that 
the system estimation of the money-demand equation did not result in 
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estimates significantly different from those produced by least squares 
regression methods, i.e., [77], [9], [3 5], and [20]. In fac t, Goldfeld 
[35] a nd Dickson and Star leaf [ 20) reported that the two-stage least-
squares estimates of the parameters are similar to single-equation esti-
mates, a result consistent with the inference that the simultaneity-
equation biases are not significant e nough to distort the parameter 
estimates derived by the ordinary least squares method [57, p. 212]. 
Cooley and LeRoy [15], however, argue that Goldfeld's estimation of 
the parameters using the two-stage l east squares method is inconsistent. 
According to them, Goldfeld's conclusion with respect to the simultanei-
ty equation biases suggests that his estimates derived from the ordinary 
least squares and the two-stage least squares methods have "approximate-
ly the same inconsistency" [p. 838]. The inconsistency arises from 
Goldfeld's formulation of instrumental variables. 
The method of instrumental variables involves the search for a 
new variable Z which is both highly correlated with the 
independent variable X and at the same time uncorrelated wi th 
the error term in the equation [66, p. 179 ] . 
It is clear that Goldfeld's use of the discount rate as one of the 
instrumental variables is objectionable based on this definition. 
According to Cooley and LeRoy [15], the discount rate is a suitable 
instrument only if one assumes that its correlation with the error is 
low. They argue 
On the traditional interpretation the Federal Reserve uses the 
discount rate as an instrument to influence the money stock, 
implying that it will surely respond to random shifts in money 
demand [p. 838]. 
Therefore, they conclude that "We are left unconvinced that demand has 
been consistently estima ted" [p. 838]. 
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Accordingly, the simultaneity issue cannot simply be dismissed on 
the grounds that other investigators have concluded that the simultane-
ity equation biases are not large enough to distort the parameter esti-
mates from single-equation, implying that least squares estimation is 
justified. The simultaneity issue is taken into account in the two-
stage least squares estimation. 
The second aspect of the identification problem is the question of 
exogeneity of the money supply. The conventional approach to the demand 
for money is to relate the supply of money to the arguments of the 
demand for money function. Laidler [54] argues that "• •• question 
concerns what in practice are the most frequent sources of disturbance 
and which variables usually bear the brunt of subsequent adjustments" 
[p. 237]. According to Laidle r, i n the case of a given individual 
agent, one can treat the general price level, the rate of interest, and 
individual income and wealth as given. In this context, there probably 
would be little objection to argue that the individual's holding o f cash 
balances varies a s a consequence of his own choices. Therefore, it 
would be reasonable to specify an individual's demand for money in the 
conventional way. However, to argue tha·t the economy as a whole is a 
mere representative of an individual agent, "is to commit a fallacy of 
composition" (p. 237). 
Laidler [54] goes on to argue that financial market behavior based 
on the credit ma rket hypothesis suggests that the money s tock rather 
than the interest rate may be taken as the exogenous variable. Starting 
with a ful l portfolio equilibrium, he analyzes the behavior of the 
financial market to the moneta ry a u thority's decision to raise the price 
at which they are wi lling to buy securities. According to Laidler, this 
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action by the monetary authority leads to an attempt by the nonbank 
public to substitute physical capital for securities. In order to be 
able to do so, the nonbank public attempts to acquire necessary pur-
chasing power by offering securities to the banks. •rhe banking system 
then, as a whole, will be able to supply that money by offering securi-
ties to the authorities. This excess amount of money is created not 
because the nonbank public as a whole wants to hold it, but because the 
public wants to use it to purchase physical capital. However, once 
created, this excess money would set in motion "streams of expenditure," 
and therefore affects the arguments of the demand for money, namely, 
prices, income, and consequently money holdings. In this case, it is 
clear that the demand for money responds passively to variations in the 
supply of money, rather than vice versa and according to Laidler, "Such 
a process is not properly captured in conventional formulations ••• " 
[p. 2 36]. 
The empirical works on the exogeneity of the money supply have 
provided mixed results. For instance, Sims 1 [74] investigation with · 
respect to the relationship between GNP and the money supply showed that 
"causality does not run one way from GNP to money" (p. 541] and based on 
this he concluded "One clearly should not estimate a demand for money 
relation from these data, treating GNP as exogenous with money [supply] 
on ·the left-hand side" (p. 550). 
On the other hand, Mehra [57] tested the exogeneity of money supply 
in the money-demand equation and concluded 
The usual practice of regressing real money on real income and 
nominal interest rates in a single-equation estimation is 
validated, and there is nothing to be gained by estimating 
money-demand equations with real income or interest rates as 
the left-hand-side variable" (p. 227]. 
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The foregoing discussion suggests little work has been done to 
incorporate formal exogeneity test procedures into the demand for money 
specification. By and large, the assumptions underlying the endogeneity 
of the money supply are imposed~ priori without any statistical ration-
alization. Therefore, this dissertation will test to see if money sup-




Based on the theoretical models discussed in the preceding 
chapters, it was argued that the previous work on the topic has misspe-
cified the demand for money equation. The misspecification arose from 
the fact that the previous works had failed to incorporate the income 
taxation into their specifi cation of money demand equation. The theo-
retical work developed by Tobin [81], Domar and Musgrave [21] and others 
suggested t hat i nvestors compensate for the tax rate on investment 
income by increasing holdings of the risky asset. Thi s, in turn, im-
plied that a tax of this kind would reduce his dema nd for cash at any 
marke t rate of interest. 
In order to correct for this misspecification, the nominal rate of 
inter est is r eplaced by this rate ne t-of-taxe s . In a country with 
income taxes, for which interest receipts are taxable and i nteres t 
payments are deductible, it is the after-tax rate of interes t that is 
relevant for individual constraints and therefore determines behavior. 
The theoretical models presented in Chapter II I provided testable 
specifications for household, business, and aggregated demand for money. 
Three testable hypotheses h ave also been specified. For the household 
sec tor, it was argued tha t allocation of the total wealth between the 
means of exchange and i nterest-bearing assets depends upon the cost of 
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transacting between the two forms of holding wealth and the explicit 
rate of interest on the interest-bearing notes. However, since the 
transaction cost in the case of the household sector is not tax deducti-
ble, while interest income is, it was argued that the imposition of tax-
ation on interest income reduces the yield of interest-bearing notes 
while leaving the cost of transactions intact. This, in turn, implies 
that a change in the tax rate would generate a series of adjustments in 
the household demand for cash even if the level of transactions and the 
rate of interest stays constant. Based on this discussion, it was ar-
gued that the tax rate does indeed belong in the household demand for 
money. Accordingly, the null hypothesis was stated as: The tax-
adjusted specification is the true model for the household demand for 
money; while the alternative hypothesis was stated as: The non-tax 
specification is the true model. 
In the case of the business demand for money, it was argued that 
the cost of transacting between cash and alternative forms of holding 
assets are tangible costs and, therefore, tax deductible. Consequently, 
the income tax reduces both the marginal costs and returns of cash 
economizing by the same proportion and leaves the business demand for 
money invariant with respect to tax rate. In light of this argument, 
the null hypothesis was stated as: The non-tax formulation of this 
deniand is the true model. 
With respect to the aggregate demand for money, this study used the 
inventory theoretic model as the point of departure. Based on this 
model, an increase in the tax rate results in larger cash balances due 
to the negative substitution effect. While the substitution effect was 
said to be the direct and obvious effect, another equally important but 
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less obvious force was also identified. This effect,. known as the 
risk-sharing factor, is said to be operating in the opposite direction 
from the substitution effect. As a result, the final effect of changes 
in the tax rate on the demand for money is ambiguous. If either effedt 
dominates the other one, then the tax rate does indeed belong in the 
aggregate demand for money and therefore--as in the case of household 
demand for money--one expects the tax-adjusted demand for money to be 
the true model. 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of the 
empirical tests of these hypotheses. 
Alternative Specification of a 
Conventional Equation 
The standard Goldfeld equation was used for the purpose of model 
specification. In 1973, this equation became the standard formulation. 
However, since then forecasts from this equation began to overpredict 
real money balances. The relatively poor performance of the Goldfeld 
equation for the post-1973 time period has prompted doubts as to the 
robustness of this specification. The purpose of this section is to 
test the Goldfeld equation against some other alternatives, so as to 
find the best specification. The Goldfeld equation has the following 
farm: 
Ln M1 = Ln c + B1 Ln Y + B2 Ln RTD + B3 Ln RCP + B4 Ln M1 (-1 ) 
where M1 = real money balances, Y = real GNP, RTD rate on passbook 
savings accounts, RCP = rate on three month prime commercial paper, and 
M1 (-1) = M1 lagged one quarter. This specification is tested against 
the following three alternatives. 
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Ln M1 Ln c + B1 Ln Y + B2 RTD + B3 RCP + B4 Ln M1 (-1) 
Ln M1 Ln C + B1 Ln Y + B2 Ln RCP + B3 Ln LTRATE + B4 Ln M1 (-1) 
Ln M1 Ln c + B1 Ln Y + B2 Ln LTRATE + B3 Ln M1 (-1 ) 
where LTRATE = yield on long-term Treasury bonds. The first alternative 
is the Friedman and Schwartz semi-log equation. This equation has the 
interest rates themselves rather than their logarithms. The second 
alternative (ALT2), has both short-term and long-term interest rates. 
Finally, the third alternative (ALT3) has only one long-term interest 
rate as the opportunity cost of money. The results of estimating these 









Ln M1 ( -1 ) 
TABLE I 
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION OF ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS 
1952:2-1980:4 
Equation 
Goldfeld Friedman ALT2 ALT3 
-.1 61 -. 1 36 -.218* .0285 






1.015* .98 2* 1.019* .9247* 
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TABLE I (Continued) 
Equation 
Variable Goldf eld Friedman ALT2 ALT3 
R2 .979 .977 • 975 .952 
Standard .0068 • 0068 • 0069 . 0074 
Error (SE) 
Durbin-Watson 2.0193 2.0035 2.0502 2.1868 
(D-W) 
p .299 • 329 .344 .497 
Sum of Squared .00509 .00510 .00516 .0060 
Residuals (SSR) 
*Significantly different from zero at 5-percent level. 
As can be seen, all four equations have provided unreasonable 
estimates. More specifically, the estimated coefficient of lagged M1 
turned out to be equal to one. This is an unacceptable speed of 
adjustJnent. 
As was discuss in Chapter II, there are reasons to believe that t he 
aggregate demand for money has indeed shifted in the 1973-1974 time 
period. The performance of the Goldfeld equation for the pre-1973 and 
post-1973 time periods has been most frequently cited as evidence for 
this suspicion. For the purpose of investigating such an institutional 
change in the empirical observations of the data and its contribution 
upon the estimation results, all four equations were estimated for two 
subsamples, covering 1952:2-1972:4 and 1973: 1-19H0:4, and a formal Chow 










Ln M1 (- 1) 
TABLE II 
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION OF ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS 
1952:2-1972:4 
Equation 
Goldfeld Friedman ALT2 ALT3 
.613* .331* .047 .667* 
.208* • 221 * .079* .1 55* 





.637* .676* .900* .695* 




I U~ = sum of squared residuals obtained from the entire sample, L U~1 
s~2 of squared residuals obtained from the 1952:2-1972:4 estimation, and 
E Ut2 = sum of squared residuals obtained from estimating the specified 
equation for the 1973:1-1979:4 time span. Tis to the number of 
observations and K the number of the indepe~ent variables. 
TABLE II (Continued) 
Equation 
Variable Goldfeld Friedman ALT2 ALT3 
R2 .978 .982 .987 .944 
SE .0043 .0043 .0046 • 0051 
D-W 1 • 8993 1 . 9597 1 • 9441 1.8882 
p .587 .539 .413 .704 
SSR .00142 .00141 .00167 .00202 










EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION OF ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS 
1973: 1-1980 : 4 
Equati on 
Goldfeld Friedman ALT2 ALT3 
1 . 164* 1 • 1 02 * -.295 .544 
.063 * .063* .036 . 0 73 




.01 18 - .081* 
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TABLE I II (Continued) 
Equation 
Variable Goldfeld Friedman ALT2 ALT3 
Ln M1 (-1) .795* .773* 1.0126* . 8 32* 
R2 .983 .985 • 971 .967 
SE .0069 .0066 .0092 . 0096 
o-w 1.9314 1 • 8991 2 .0750 1 .9229 
p 
SSR .0013 .0012 . 0023 . 0026 
*Significantly different from zero at 5-percent level. 
Tables II and III reveal that, when divided i nto two s ubsamples, 
three equations provided reasonably good estimates. Only ALT2 reported 





RESULTS OF CHOW TEST FOR THE 
ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS 
Computed Test Statistics 
18.41 
20.32 






TABLE IV (Continued) 




F-Table (DF 5,104) 
3. 1 7 
3.17 
Table IV shows the results of the Chow test. The comparison of the 
computed value of F to the value in the F table suggests that the null 
hypothesis of the equality of the estimated coefficients of the two 
different subsample structures can be rejected in all four cases. The 
test therefore rejects the hypothesis that the two sets of regression 
coefficients are the same and therefore refer to the same structure. 
Estimating the demand equation for the entire sample period would 
therefore not be appropriate since the empirical observations of the 
data do not belong to the same demand curve. 
For the present purpose, however, it is not important to 
investigate why the money demand equation shifted, but rather to find 
out if it actually shifted. Since the task of finding a demand curve 
which can be fitted to the entire sample period is an entirely different 
project and deserves an investigation on its own, this dissertation con-
tinues to work with the two subsamples in all of its empirical estima-
tions. 
For the purpose of finding the best equation among the four 
alternatives, the predicted value generated by each was compared with 
the actual values of ~' and a series of error statistics were computed. 
The results are reported in Table v. 
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TABLE V 
COMPUTED ERROR STATISTICS 
Subs ample Subs ample 
1952: 2-1972:4 1973:1-1980:4 
Equation R.MSE MAE RMSE MAE 
Goldfeld 1.305 1 • 1 20 1 . 400 1.1 43 
Friedman 1. 379 1. 1 60 1. 346 1 • 1 11 
ALT2 1. 299 1 • 1 20 1 . 770 1.716 
ALT3 1.306 1. 1 27 1. 917 1. 386 
Based on Table v, it can be seen that two of the equations, the 
Goldfeld and Friedman specifications, generate the smallest error 
statistics. The Goldfeld specification yields better statistics for the 
first subperiod, while the semi-log equation is marginally superior in 
the second subperiod. One major drawback of the semi-log equation is 
its unusually low estimates of interest rate elasticity. For example, 
the long-run elasticity of the demand for money with respect to RCP is 
.02 for the first subsamples. This is a r ather low estimate, given the 
results of the previous empirical work. 
Given that the semi-log equation has at best marginally better 
statistics for the 1973:1-1980:4 time period and also the fact that it 
generated unusually low elasticity estimates, this dissertation uses the 
Goldfeld specification as the best among the four alternatives. This 




Aggregate Demand for Money 
The proposed specifications of the aggregated demand for money are 
fitted to the empirical observation of the data, and the results are 
presented in Table VI. 
As can be recalled, the aggregate demand for money has the 
following formulation: 
Ln M1 = Ln a + B1 Ln Y + B2 Ln RCP + B3 Ln RTD + B4 Ln M1 (-1 ) 
where M1 =real money balances, Y = real GNP, RCP = rate on six month 
commercial paper, RTD 
M1 lagged one qua rter. 
rate on passbook savings deposits and M1 (-1) = 
As can be seen, both versions of the aggregated demand for money 
have reasonable parameter values. In addition, each fits the data quite 
well. At first glance, the comparison of the adjusted R-square and the 
standard error of the two equations point toward marginal superiority of 
the non-tax specification. However, the conclusion of true superiority 
of this specification against the tax-adjusted specification must wait 
pending additional tests. 
According to the econometric discussion in Chapter IV, it was 
expected that the tax-adjusted specification to report different income 
and interest elasticities. The direction of changes was said to be 
ambiguous, depending upon whic h of the two opposing f o rces, substitution 
or the risk-sharing effect, prevails. By and large, the short-run 
elasticities estimated from the tax-adjusted equation do not render the 
expected results. This point can be shown by setting up an F-test to 




















ESTIMATES OF THE TWO VERSIONS OF THE 
AGGREGATED DEMAND FOR MONEY 
1 952:2-1 972: 4 
Es tirna ted Coefficients 
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Non-Tax Specification I Tax-Adjusted Specification2 
.613* (2.92) .532* (2.45) 
.208* (6.03) .207* (5. 87) 
-.0192* (-5.3) -.0198* (-5.1 8) 
-.0361* ( -4.03) -.0334* (-3.70} 
.637* (8.48) .650* (8.56) 
.977 • 971 
.0043 .0044 




.1 0 .095 
2This equation is adjusted for the tax rate using Seater estimates 
of the marginal tax-rate. Barra and Sahasakul (B-S) [3) have estimated a 
differe nt s eries for this tax-rate. When the Goldfeld equation was 
adjusted using B-S marginal tax-rate estimates, and the equation was 
fitted to the data, the results were: 
TABLE VI (Continued) 
Ln M1 = .563 + .196 Ln y - • 0197 Ln RCPT 
(2.55) (5.75) (-5.12) 
- • 0306 Ln RTDT + .653 Ln M1(-1) 
(-3.50) (8. 57) 
R2 = .97 Std. Error = .0044 D-W = 1.9327 Rho 
It is clear that this result is almost identical to the 
tax-adjusted specification using the Seater's tax-series. 
• 628 
For a complete discussion on how each series is estimated, the 
interested reader should see Appendix A. 
*Statistically significant at 5 percent level. 
The numbers in parentheses correspond to the t-statistics. 
where the null hypothesis states that the elasticities e s timated from 
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the two specifications are the same. This test was conducted using the 
following procedure. Assume the following two regression models: 
Y = X B + U 
Y = X* B* + U* 
where X and X* are N x K matrices of independent variable observations 
for the gross and net money demand equations, respectively. The null 
hypothesis is: B - B* = o. This can be tested by es timating the 
following two regression models: 
and 
For the sake of simplicity, the first regression is called the 
unrestricted model (UR) and the second the restricted model (R). The 
null hypothesis can be tested by computing the following test 
statistics: 
FsTAT 
{ESSR - ESSuR)/K 
ESSUR/2(N-K) 
where ESSR and ESSUR represent the error sum of squares for the 
restricted and unrestricted models. 
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FsTAT is computed for the estimated equations and is equal to .108. 
The comparison of this calculated value of F to the value in the F 
table, 2.21 (dF 5, 155), suggests that the null hypothesis of the 
e quality of the estimated coefficients of the two regression models 
cannot be rejected at the five percent level. Therefore, with respect 
to the coefficients in Table VI, the null hypothesis of Ho: 
cannot be rejected. 
One possible explanation for these results may have to do with the 
fact that the nominal and net of taxes rates of interes t are highly 
correlated. The correlation coefficient estimated for these two 
variables is .98.. This, of course, can be attributed to the rather 
stable marginal tax rate measures over the entire sample period. 
Yet another explanation may have to do with the possibility of no 
causal relationship between the demand for money and the tax rate. If 
this is the case, the estimated coefficient for the tax rate would be 
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z ero, and therefore the elasticity estimates of the conventional spe-
cification yields an unbiased estimate of the true elasticity. However, 
this analysis depends crucially on the fact that the specification tests 
reject the notion of tax-adjusted specification as the true model for 
explaining the aggregated demand for money. It is, however, obvious 
that this conclusion cannot be firmly drawn until all specification 
tests are completed. 
The two versions of the aggregate demand for money are also fitted 
to the empirical observations of the data covering subsample 1973:1-
1 980: 1 • The results are reported i n Table VI I. 
Again, no substantial differences can be observed in the estimated 
coefficients of the two versions. The two equations report almost 
identical coefficients with respect to the income and interest rate 
variables. 
Household Demand for Money 
The two versions of the household demand for money we re fitted to 
the empirical observations of the data and the estimated r esults are 
presented in Table VIII. 
The househo ld demand for money has the following s pecification: 
Ln M1H = Ln a + B 1 Ln CONS + B2 Ln RCP 
+ B3 Ln RTD + B4 Ln M1H(-1) 
where M1H = household real mo n ey balances, CONS = real consumption 
expenditures, and MlH(-1) = M1H lagged one quarter. 
Table VIII indicates that, similar to the case for the aggregated 
demand for money, t h e non-tax adjusted s pecification for household 
sector appears to be marginally superior to that of the tax-adjusted 
specification, as can be seen by comparing the coefficient of 
determination and the standard error of the two regressions. 
TABLE VII 
ESTIMATES OF THE TWO VERSIONS OF THE 




Variables Non-Tax Specification Tax-Adjusted Specificati on3 
Constant 1.16 (2.73) • 761 ( 1 • 91 ) 
Ln y .062 (2.57) .064 (2.50) 
Ln RCP -.017 (- 3.49) -.016 (-3.14) 
Ln RTD -.298 (-4.63) -.276 (-4.24) 
Ln M1(-1) .795 ( 1 4 . 99) .845 (17.5 1 ) 
R2 .98 .98 
Stand. Error of 
Regression .0068 • 0 0 7 1 
D-W 1.9314 1.9098 
h = .203 .265 
3The conventional formulation, when adjusted f or the tax rate using 
B-S tax-estimates, reported the following resu l t s 
Ln Ml = .775 + .022 Ln Y - .013 Ln RCP 
(1.75) (.85) (-2.14) 
- .226 Ln RTD + .879 Ln M1 (-1 ) 
(-3.54) (1H.27) 
TABLE VII (Continued) 
D-W = 1 .9269 Std. Error = .0076 h = .215 
The estimated models report unreasonably low income elasticities 
(.18). In addition, this equation reports the highest standard error 
amongst the three alternatives. The interest rate elasticity, both 
short and long run, is however close. 
The numbers in parentheses correspond to the t-statistics. 
Also, similar to the aggregated demand for money, the null 
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hypothesis of the equality of the point estimates of the coefficients of 
the two regressions cannot be rejected for the scale and interest rate 
variables in the household demand for money. For testing this 
hypothesis, the test-statistics described for the aggregated demand for 
money were computed. It turned out that the FSTAT is equal to 0.114, 
which when compared with that of the table, ( 2. 21, dF 5, 1 55), suggests 
that the null hypothesis, Ho: Bi - B~ = 0 cannot be rejected at the 5 
l. 
percent level. This, in turn, implies although the inclusion of the 
tax-variable in the household demand for money did in general result in 
a lower elasticity of this demand with respect to income and the rate on 
time deposits, though the difference is not statistically significant. 
As was discussed in Chapter III, given the relatively low cost of 
adjustment in the case of the household sector, one would expect that 
the speed of adjustment would be much faster for households than for the 
aggregated equation. This is borne out by the household speed of 
adjustment. In general, it can be seen that the household sector acts 
twice as fast as the aggregated economy to adjust for any discrepancy 
between the optimal and the actual money balances. The difference 
between the case of the household and the aggregated versions is, of 
course, a result of a very slow speed of adjustment for the business 
sector. The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in the 
business demand for money would be evidence of the truth of this 
argument. 
TABLE VIII 
RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION FOR THE 
HOUSEHOLD D~~AND FOR MONEY 
1 952: 2-1 972: 4 
Estimated Coefficients 
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Ln R 'rD 






-.642 (-2.28)* -. 5 29 ( -1 • 71 ) 
.703 (7.43)* .667 {6.97) * 
-.0134 (- 1 .19) -.0143 (-1.20) 
-.156 (-5.33)* -.139 (-4.66)* 





TABLE VIII (Continued) 
Estimated Coefficients 









4Tax-Adjusted Specification, using B-S tax series: 
Ln M1H = -.568 + .684 Ln CONS - .0139 Ln RCPT 
(-1.86) (7.14) (-1.18) 
- .145 Ln RTDT + .233 Ln M1 (-1) 
(-4.86) (2.26) 
R2 = .879 Std. Error= .0136 o-w= 2.0665 
*Significantly different from zero at 5 percent level. 
Rho = • 681 
The numbers in the parentheses correspond to the t-statistics. 
Another striking difference between the household and the 
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aggregated demand for money can be seen when one compares the short-run 
and long-run elasticities of the demand for money with respect to the 
scale variable and the rate on time deposits. The comparison of the 
estimated elasticities reveals that the elasticities are much larger for 
the households than they are for the aggregated economy. This is what 
Hamburger [39) found. 
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Table IX reports the estimated coefficients of the regres sion model 













EMPIRICAL ESTIMA'l'ES OF 'fHE HOUSEHOLD 
DEMAND FOR MONEY 
1 973: 1-1 980:4 
Estimated Coefficients 
Non-Tax Specification Tax-Adjusted SpecificationS 
1 • 1 6 ( 1 • 94) 1 • 19 ( 1 • 99) 
.1 66 (2.29) .1 48 (2.20) 
- .028 (-2. 26) -.029 (-2.33) 
-.449 (-3.11) -.478 {-3.21) 
.690 (6.53) .700 (6.82) 
.81 .82 
.0198 .0196 
1 • 7 881 1.7972 
.74 • 70 
5Tax-Adjusted Specification, adjusted by B-S estimates: 
Ln M1H = 1.88- .00008 Ln CONS- .028 Ln RCPT 
(2.76) (-.002) (-2.26) 
-.421 Ln RTDT + .732 Ln M1H(-1) 
( - 3.10) (7.37) 
• B 1 Std. Error .0197 D-W 1 • 8252 h = • 72 
TABLE IX (Continued) 
This equation provides identical interest rate elasticity, but 
substantially different income elasticity. This estimate on CONS is 
unreasonably low and carries the wrong sign. 
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Yet, again, as in the case of the aggregated demand for money, the 
tax-adjusted specification of the household demand for money failed to 
generate the expected results with respect to the elasticity issue. 
Although in general the tax-adjusted equation did report lower elastici-
ties than the non-tax equation, nonetheless the null hypothesis of the 
corresponding two coefficients--derived from the two specifications' be-
ing equal--were not rejected, making the two estimates of elasticities 
statistically the same. One explanation for this apparent f ailure of 
the tax-adjusted equation may have to do with the possibility that the 
empirical data may not support the theoretical work on the point that 
the tax-variable belongs in the household demand for money. Although a 
clear possibility, the final verdict on this must wait pending comple-
tion of the specification tests. 
Business Demand for Money 
The proposed specifications of the business demand for money were 
fitted to the empirical observations of the data, and the results are 
presented in Table X. 
The business demand for money has the fo l lowing formulation: 
Ln M1B = Ln a+ B1 Ln SALE+ B2 Ln RCP + B3 Ln M1B(-1) 
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where M1B = business real holdings of cash balances, SALE = manufactur-
ing and trade real sales, and M1B(-1) = M1B lagged one quarter. 
TABLE X 
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION OF THE TWO VERSIONS OF THE 













Non-Tax Specification Tax-Adjusted Specification6 
.583 (2.04) .548 (1.91) 
.0437 (2.89) .0491 (3.05) 
-.0195 (-2.47) -.0212 (-2.65) 
.819 (12.33) .818 (12.41) 
.8163 .8155 
.016 .016 
1 • 941 6 1. 9571 
.240 .244 
The numbers in pare ntheses correspond to the t-statistics. 
6Business money demand adjusted for tax-rate using B-S series: 
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TABLE X (Continued) 
Ln M1B = • 551 + .0484 Ln SALE - .0212 Ln RCPT 
( 1 • 93) (3.07) (-2.66) 
+ .818 Ln M1B(-1) 
(12.42) 
R2 = .80 D-W = 1. 9583 Std. Error • 016 h = • 236 
As can be recalled from Chapter III, in the case of business demand 
for money, both the cost and return from cash economizing are money 
costs and therefore tax-deductible. Consequently, since the tax-rate 
reduces the marginal cost and return by the same proportion, the 
business demand for money is invariant with respect to the tax-rate; the 
non-tax specification should therefore be the true model to represent 
the firms ' demand for money. 
In light of this argument , it is obvious that one should not expect 
the elasticity of the business demand for money with respect to the 
transactions variable and the rate of interest, estimated fr om the two 
proposed specifications, to be statistically different. To tes t this 
proposition, an F-test identical to the one described for the aggregated 
demand for money was set up to test the following hypotheses : 
Ho: 
where the null hypothesis states that the corresponding elasticities of 
the two specifications are statistically di f ferent, while the alterna-
tive hypothesis i s that they are statistica l ly equal. 
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The results of the tests clearly indicated that the null hypothesis 
can be rejected for both the scale and the inter~st variable, therefore 
implying that the two sets of estimates derived from the two regressions 
are statistically the same. That is, of course, consistent with the 
view that the tax variable does not belong in the business demand for 
money and the elasticity of this sector's demand for money with respect 
to the transaction and the rate of interest variable, estimated from the 
non-tax specification, are the unbiased estimates. 
A close exarni nation of the estirna ted coeffi cients of the lagged 
dependent variable in Table III reveals that the business sector's 
responsiveness to changes in the short-term rate of interest appears to 
be very sluggish. This is consistent with the analysis presented in 
Chapter III. It was postulated that corporations, faced with large 
overhead expenses, will become more and more actively engaged in cash 
economizing techniques if they are convinced that the trend in interest 
rates is going to persist for a long period. 
The proposed specification for the business money demand equation 
is also fi t ted to the empirical observation of the data covering the 
subsample 1973:1-1980:4 and the results are shown in Table XI. 
When e stimated over the 1973:1-1980:4 time span, the specification 
completely breaks down. It reports unreasonably slow speeds of 
adjustment. In addition, the estimated income and interest elasticities 
are not significantly different from zero. The former also has the 
wrong sign. The results of the tax-ad justed equation are identical to 
the non-tax format, thus the tax-adjusted equation does not provide any 
improvements. When Seater's tax-series are replaced by the B-S series, 
the results are identi cal. 
TABLE XI 
ESTIMATES OF THE TWO VERSIONS OF THE 
BUSINESS DEMAND FOR MONEY 
1 973: 1-1 980:4 
Equation 
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Variables Non-Tax Specification I Tax-Adjusted Specification? 
Constant .250 (. 98) .249 (1. 00 
Ln SALE -. 001 (-.43) -. 001 (-.43) 
Ln RCP -. 011 (- . 70) -. 011 (-.74) 
Ln M1 B(-1 ) .946 ( 16.48) .945 (16.52) 
.94 .94 
Std. Error .0233 .0233 
D-W 2.3476 2.3473 
h-statistics -1.04 - 1.03 
?Business money demand adjusted for tax-r ate using B-S s eries: 
Ln M1B = .241 - .001 Ln SALE- .011 Ln RCPT + .94 7 M1B(-1) 
(.98) (- .44) (-.76) (16.73) 
R2 = .94 D-W = 2.3478 Std. Error= .0231 h -1.02 
This result implies the observed instability in the aggregate 
demand for money may be largely due to the erratic behavior of the 
business demand equation. 
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Tax Rate and the Demand for Money: Substitution 
and Risk-Sharing Effects 
As was discussed, changes in the tax rate have two major effects on 
the demand for money--(a) the substitution effect, and (b) the risk-
sharing effect. The purpose of this section is to identify the dominant 
effect. 
In the inventory theoretic model, the tax rate enters the demand 
for money through its effect on the opportunity cost of holding money. 
Using the inventory model as the point of departure, the following 
equation is specified: 
Ln M1 = Bo + B1 Ln RCP (1 - t) + B2 Ln RTD(1-t) 
+ B3 Ln Y + B4 Ln M1 (-1) 
This equation explicitly accounts only for the substitution effect since 
the opportunity cost is represented by the net interest rate rather than 
the nominal rate. In order to consider the risk-sharing effect in this 
equation, it is adjusted to give: 
Ln M1 Bo + B1 Ln RCP(1-t) + B2 Ln RTD(1-t) 
+ B3 Ln Y + B4 Ln M1 (-1) + Bs Ln (1-t) 
In this context, the terms RCP(1-t) and RTD(1-t) capture the 
substitution adjustments and the term Ln {1-t) picks up any residual 
effect which is not picked up in the net interest rates or the risk-
sharing adjusnnent. In order to identify the dominant effect, this 
equation can be expanded to give: 
(A) 
where BS 
Ln M1 = Bo + B1 Ln RCP + B2 Ln R'.rD + B3 Ln Y 
+ B4 Ln M1 (-1) + B* Ln (1-t) 5 
Based on D-M's analysis Bs > o, because 
a Ln M1 a Ln M1 
at < 0 or a (l-t) > O. The empirical results 
< indicate that B1 and B2 are negative, which implies that BS > O, as 
< B5 ) B1 + B2 • In other words: 
1 • If BS > 0, the risk-sharing effect outweighs the 
substitution effect. 
2. If BS < 0, the substitution effect is the dominant 
3. 
factor. 
If B* = 0, the two effects cancel each other. 
5 
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This testing procedure is applied to the ag gregate and household demand 
for money, and the results are reported in Table xrr.B 
The results indicate that, in the cases of t h e aggregate and 
business sectors, the two opposing forces just offset each other. 
However, in the case of the household sector, the risk-sharing factor is 
8 The reported regression models for the aggregate, household and 
business demand for money are: 
Ln M1 = .640 + .203 Ln Y - .01H7 Ln RC~ - . 0359 Ln RTD 
(2.83) (5.94) (-5.07) (-3.98) 
+ .639 Ln M1 (-1) + .0242 Ln {1-t) 
(8.37) (.60) 
R2 = .98 D-W = 1 .8869 Std. Error • 0043 Rho = .565 
Ln M1H = -.205 + .642 Ln CONS - .006 Ln RCP - .158 Ln RTD 
{-.73) (7.21) (-.57) (-5. 9 3) 
+ .243 Ln M1H(-1) + .367 Ln (1-t) 
(2.52) (3.06) 
R2 = .93 D-W = 2.0063 Std. Error= .0127 = .0127 Rho .595 
Ln M1B = .438 + .0689 Ln SALE- ,0227 Ln RCP 
(1.50) (3.42) (-2.85) 
+ .810 Ln M1B(-1) - .150 Ln (1-t) 
(12.35) (-1 . 8 5) 
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the dominant factor. As a result, as the tax rate increases, household 
demand for money declines. 
TABLE XII 
THE ESTIMATED Bs COEFFICIEN~S FOR THE THREE 
DEMAND FOR MONEY EQUATIONS 
1 952:4-1 972:4 
Equation Estimated Bs 
Aggregate Demand for Money* .024 
Household Demand for Money* .367 
Business Demand for Money -.150 





The described test was conducted to cover the 1973:1-1~80:4 
subperiod. The results are reported in Table XIII. 
As Table XIII indicates, the two opposing effectx offset each 
other, leaving demand for money invariant to the changes in tax rate in 
all three cases. 
Testing Hypotheses 
Household Demand for Money 
The theoretical work indicates that the net interest rate belong in 
the household demand for money. In this section, the Davidson and 
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MacKinnon and Pesaran-Deaton, specification tests are used to 
investigate whether this proposition is supported by the data. 
TABLE XIII 
* THE ESTIMATED Bs COEFFICIENTS FOR THE 
THREE DEMAND FOR MONEY EQUATIONS 
1 973: 1-1980:4 
Equation Estimated Bs t-statistics 
Aggregate Demand for Money -.032 -.17 
Household Demand for Money -.123 -.83 
Business Demand for Money -1 • 01 -1.73 
As was stated in Chapter IV, the hypotheses are stated as follows: 
Ho the tax-adjusted specification is the true model. 
H1 the non-tax specification is the true model. 
The null hypothesis simply states that the conventional approach, 
namely, the non-tax specification, is the true model to represent the. 
household demand for money. The alternative hypothesis is stated as: 
The tax-adjusted specification is the true model for representing this 
sector's demand for cash balances. 
The hypotheses can be tested by simply looking at the relative 
performance of the two specifications in terms of the standard error of 
the regression and the residual sum of squares. On this criterion, 
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Table XV reveals that the non-tax specification is marginally superior 
to the tax-adjusted specification. 
Alternatively, one can also compare the predicted values of each 
specification with the actual va l ues of the dependent variables and 
compute a series of error statistics. Or, one can rees t imate the two 
equations over a shortened period and then compare their relative fore-
casting abilities over the remainder of the sample period. Tables XIV 
and XV show the results of applying these two simple testing procedures 
to the proposed specifications of the household demand for money. 
As Table XIV indicates, the tax-adjusted specificati on gives 
slightly lower error statistics. A further test of the relative 
performance of the two specifications is also provided in Table XV. 
TABLE XIV 
COMPARISON OF THE ACTUAL AND PREDICTED SERIES AT 'l'HE 
HOUSEHOLD DEMAND FOR MONEY (1952:2-1972:4) 
Equation RMSE MAE 
Non-Tax Specification .00968 .0080 
Tax-Adjusted Specification .00931 .0077 
RMSE = Root-Mean-Square-Error. 
MAE = Mean-Absolute-Error. 
TABLE XV 
ERROR STATISTICS OF 1966:1-1972:4 FORECASTS 
FOR THE HOUSEHOLD DEMAND FOR MONEY 
Equation RMSE MAE 
Non-Tax Specification .0113 .0099 
Tax-Adjusted Speci fication • 0111 .0095 
The household demand for money, in both versions, was reestimated 
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for the time-period 1952:2-1965:4, and then the remainder of the sample 
period was forecasted based on this reestimated equation. As Table XV 
indicates, the tax-adjusted specification performed marginally better in 
forecas t ing the 1966:1-1972:4 values of household demand for money. 
Davidson and MacKinnon's specification test allows a test of a 
mode l against a non-nested alternative. The predicted values of the 
dependent variable from the alternative specification are used as an 
independent argument in the equation which is believed to be the true 
model. If the estimated coeffic ient for this variable, a, is not 
statistically different from zero, the null hypothes is of the equation's 
.being the true model cannot be rejected. If the coefficient is signifi-
cantly greater than zero, the n the null hypothesis is rejected. Since 
the results of the test crucially depend upon the magnitude of a single 
coefficient, a high degree of multicollineari ty among the independent 
variables distorts the accuracy of the test. In order to deal with this 
situation, the test was applied using both the level, a nd the first 
difference of the data. Plosser and Schwert [64] argue that, by using 
the first differences the time trend is eliminated and the high 
frequency component of the data is emphasized. Consequently the 
multi-collinearity problem is reduced. 10 Table XVI represents the 
results of the Davidson-MacKinnon specification test for the household 
demand for money. 
TABLE XVI 
RESULTS OF DAVIDSON-MacKINNON SPECIFICATION 
TEST (1952:2-1972:4) 
Level of the Data a 
Non-Tax Spe cification .340 
Tax-Adjusted Specification 1. 229 
First Difference of the Data 
Non-Tax Specification -3.227 
Tax-Adjusted Specification 3. 402 
*Significant at 5 percent level. 
t-test 
1 . 070 
4.140* 
-1 • 7 55 
2. 391 * 
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a = the coefficient for the predicted series of M1H from the alternative 
specification. 
10Hamburger (39] u s ed the f irst di f ference of the data f or 
apparently the same reason. 
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With the non-tax specification hypothesized as the true model the 
Davidson-MaKinnon test indicates that the null hypothesis (that the 
non-tax specification is the true model) cannot be rejected; the non-tax 
specification is not significantly different. In order to test the 
tax-adjusted specification against the alternative model, the testing 
procedure is reversed. In this case, the null hypothesis is that the 
tax-adjusted specification is the true model and the predicted values of 
the non-tax specification became observations on the independent 
variable in the former equation. The Davidson-MacKinnon specification 
test, using the leve l of the data, reject the null hypothesis that the 
tax-adjusted equation is the true model for representing the household 
demand for money; the t-ratio associated with the a coefficient for the 
tax-adjusted equation is significant at the one percent level. Tests 
using the first differences of the data render the same conclusion, 
namely, the null hypothesis that the non-tax specification is the true 
model was not rejected, while the hypothesis that the tax-adjusted 
specification being the true specification was rejected at the five 
percent significance level. 
The two versions of the household demand for money were tested 
against each other by using the Pesaran and Deaton (P-D) test. The 
results are shown in Table XVII. 
The P-D specification test confirms the D-M test results. Namely, 
the null hypothesis that the non-tax specification is the true model 
cannot be rejected, while the null hypothesis that the tax-adjusted 
equation is the true model is rejected at the one percent l evel. 
The results of the specification tests are startling at first 
glance. By and large, based on the theoretical work, one would expect 
that the tax-adjusted specification would be superior to the non-tax 
equation. However, the empirical data do not support this view. Both 
specification tests reject the tax-adjusted equation, while neither 
rejects the conventional formulation. This implies that despite the 
theoretical prediction, it is the non-tax specification which is the 
true model in the case of the household demand for money. 
TABLE XVII 















However, this result is in agreement wi th the previous empirical 
work on the topic. As can be recalled from Chapter II, Butters ( 1 1] 
surveyed a nonrandom sample of 749 investors and asked how the 1944 tax 
changes influenced their portfolio. Almost 70 percent responded that it 
had no influence on their investment decisions. In a study by the 
University of Michigan (2], Butters 1 conclusion was confirmed. They 
concluded that only a small percentage of the population under study was 
actually aware of the changes in the tax law and toOk that i nto 
consideration. Given these limited surveys and the results of the 
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specification tests by this study, the conclusion can be stated as: The 
relevant opportunity cost of holding money for the household seems to be 
the nominal rate of interest and not the rate net of taxes. 
Business Demand for Money 
As has been discussed throughout this study, the theoretical work 
points out that the tax variable is irrelevant to the business demand 
for money. In this context, the null hypothesis for the business sector 
can be stated as: The non tax-adjusted specification is superior to the 
conventional formulation and therefore represents the true model, while 
the alternative hypothesis can be stated as: The two models are 
basically the same with regard to explaining the behavior of the 
business sector. 
The stated hypotheses for the business sector were tested by 
comparing the relative performance of the two specifications in predict-
ing the actual data series and by comparing the forecasting ability of 
the two equations. The results of these basic tests are reported in 
Tables XVIII and XIX. Tables XVIII and XIX indicate that the tax-
adjusted equation has a slight edge over the alternative specification. 
In the search for the correct specification, the two alternative 
formulations are tested against each other using both the Davidson-
MacKinnon and the Pesaran-Deaton specification tests. The results are 
reported in Tables XX and XXI. 
As can be seen from Tables XX and XXI, both tests indicated that 
neither specification can be rejected when tested against the 
alternative equation. In a sense, one cannot reject the hypothesis 
that, in explaining the business sector money demand functions, the two 
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specifications are on equal footing. This conclusion, of course, agrees 
with the~ priori expectation that the business demand for money stays 
invariant with respect to the tax-variable, and no gain can be expected 
from including the tax variable in the argument of this sector's demand 
for money. 
TABLE XVIII 
COMPARISON OF ACTUAL AND PREDICTED SERIES OF THE 
BUSINESS DEMAND FOR MONEY EQUATIONS 
1 952:2-1972:4 
Equation RMSE MAE . 
Non-Tax Specification .0156 .00935 
Tax-Adjusted Specification .0156 .00944 
TABLE XIX 
ERROR STATISTICS OF 1966-1972 FORECAST FOR 
BUSINESS DEMAND FOR MONEY 
Equation RMSE MAE 
Non-Tax Specifica tion .0198 .0115 
Tax-Adjusted Specification .0191 .0102 
TABLE XX 
RESULTS OF DAVIDSON-MacKINNON SPECIFICATION TEST 
FOR BUSINESS DEMAND FOR MONEY 
Using the Level of the Data t-stat 
Non-Tax Specification 7.0764 1.8554 
Tax-Adjusted Specification -6.05167 -1 .6004 
TABLE XXI 
RESULTS OF PESARAN-DEATON SPECIFICATION TEST FOR 
BUSINESS DEMAND FOR MONEY 
Equation T V( T ) N-Ratio 
Non-Tax Specification -.216 .0137 -1 • 85 
Tax-Adjusted Specification .21 .0158 1. 67 
Aggregated Demand for Money 
The same testing procedures were applied to the aggregated demand 
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for money specifications. First, the equations were estimated over the 
entire sample, and the predicted and actual values were compared and the 
error statistics were computed. Next, the two specifications were esti-
mated over the 1952:2-1965:4 time period and the remainder of the sample 
observation was forecasted based on these estimations. The results of 
these tests a re shown in Table s XXI I and XXI II. 
TABL E XXII 
COMPARISON OF THE ACTUAL AND PREDICTED SERIES OF ~HE 
TWO SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE AGGREGATED DEMAND 
FOR MONEY (SAMPLE PERIOD 1952:2-1972:4) 
Equation RMSE MAE 
Non-Tax Specification .00603 .00523 
Tax-Adjusted Specification .00604 .00531 
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As can be seen fran Tables XXII and XXIII, in both criteria the two 
specifications give almost the same error statistics. This implies that 
neither specification can be preferred to the other based on these 
results. 
In order to see which specification is representing the true model, 
the Pesaran-Deaton and Davidson-MacKinnon specification tests were 
applied, and results are reported in Tables XXIV and XXV. 
The results of the Davidson-MacKinnon specification test depend 
upon the t-values of the a.-coefficient. If a. is significantly greater 
than zero, then the null hypothesis that the corresponding equation is 
the true model is rejected. If, however, a. is not statistically 
different from zero, then the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. As is 
clear fran Table XVI, the Davidson-MacKinnon specification test implies 
that neither speci fication can be rejected. In other words, the two 
alternatives are equally capable of explaining the movements of the 
aggregate demand for money. 
TABLE XXI II 
ERROR STATISTICS FOR 1966-1 972 FORECAS'fS 
FOR THE AGGREX.;A TED DEMAND FOR MONEY 
Equation RMSE MAE 
Non-Tax Specification .0157 .0149 
Tax-Adjusted Specification .0159 .0150 
TABLE XXIV 
RESULTS OF DAVIDSON-MacKINNON SPECIFICATION 
TEST FOR THE AGGREGATE DEMAND FOR MONEY 
(1952:2-1972:4) 
t-s tat 
Non-Tax Specification -.1 29 -.132 
Tax-Adjusted Specification 1. 111 1. 232 
In order to complete the testing procedure, the the two 
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specifications were tested against each other, using the P-D specifica-
tion test. The results are reported in Table XXV. 
As was stated, the P-D specification test is based on the magnitude 
of the N-ratio. At the five percent level, if this test statistic is 
less than 1 .96, then we cannot reject the hypothesis that the corre-
sponding specif ication represents the true model. However, if the 
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N-ratio is larger than 1 .96, then the hypothesis can be rejected at the 
5 percent level of significance. 
TABLE XXV 
RESULTS OF PESARAN-DEATON SPECIFICATION TEST :E'OR THE 
AGGREGATED DEMAND FOR MONEY (1952:2-1972:4) 
T V(T) 
Non-Tax Specification -2.29 13.90 




Table XXV indicates that neither specification can be rejected. 
This implies that no distinction can be made as to which specification 
is the true model. In a sense, the result can be interpreted as the two 
equations are basically the same and there is nothing to be gained by 
treating the tax variable as one of the arguments in the demand for 
money function. 
Although both specification tests reject the theoretical prediction 
that the conventional work on the topic has misspecified the demand for 
money, the results should not be taken as unexpected. The aggregated 
demand for money is composed of the demand for money by the following 
sectors: household, business, state and local government, financial 
sectors, and the rest of the world. However, historically, about 90 
p e rcent of the tota l money in the economy has been held by the household 
and business sectors. This implies that, for all practical purposes, 
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one can reasonably assume that the aggregated demand for money is 
composed of the household and business demand for money. Working within 
this framework, it is clear that the theory suggests that the tax rate 
is only relevant to the household demand equation, while business demand 
for money is said to be invariant with respect to the ~ax variable. 
Therefore, for demand for money to be a function of the tax rate as well 
as other variables, it is necessary, but not sufficient, that the 
tax rate be a valid argument in the household demand for money. 
However, the data clearly rejected the tax-adjusted specification as the 
true model for the household sector. Given the result for the household 
sector, one expects that the specification test should not result in the 
superiority of the tax-adjusted specification in the case of aggregated 
demand for money; and that is what the results indicate. 
Tax Rate and the Demand for Money: 
An Alternative Test 
A closer examination of the empirical observations of the data 
reveals that in the first quarters of 1964 and 1968 there was a 
substantial change in tax laws in the first quarter of 1964 and the 
third quarter of 1968. For example, in 1964 the personal marginal tax 
was reduced from 17.4 percent to 14.6 percent. In the same year, 
corporate marginal taxes were reduced from 52 to 50 percent. In the 
third quarter of 1968, the economy experienced a change in the opposite 
direction. The marginal individual income tax rate was increased from 
14.9 to 17.3 percent while the corporate marginal tax was increased from 
48 to 52.8 percent. For both periods, nominal interest rates stayed 
relatively constant, e.g., RCP increased from 3.91 to 3.95 percent in 
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1964 and stayed constant at 5.96 percent throughout the 1968:3-1968:4 
time period. 
Given this fact, the issue of which equation is the true model can 
be addressed by estimating the two alternative specifications over the 
subsample 1952:2-1972:4, while treating 1964:1 and 1968:3 as outliers. 
The estimated equation then can be used to forecast the total money 
holdings for these two periods. The comparison of the predicted and 
actual values in this case can be used to compare the relative 
performance of the two alternative specifications. If the tax-adjusted 
specification is the true model, then it should give smaller error 
statistics. The results of this test are presented in Table XXVI. 
TABLE XXVI 
COMPARISON OF THE ACTUAL ANU PREDICTED 
SERIES FOR 1964:1 AND 1968:1 
RMSE 
Aggregate Demand for Money 
Non-Tax Specification .4668 
Tax-Adjusted Specification* .2888 
Household Demand for Money 
Non-Tax Specification .4650 
Tax-Adjusted Specification* .9874 
Business Demand for Money 
Non-Tax Specification 1. 670 









TABLE XXVI (Continued) 
*Adjusted using Seater's tax-series 
In the case of the household sector, the tax-adjusted specification 
is found to be inferior to the non-tax specification. !-'or the business 
sector, the two specifications generate almost identical error 
statistics. These two findings agree with the results obtained from the 
specification tests. 
In the case of aggregate demand for money, however, the RMSE 
generated by the non-tax specification is approximately 62 percent 
larger than the one reported by the tax-adjusted formulation. This 
implies, for the aggregate sector, the net interest money demand 
equation is clearly superior to the alternative specification, at least 
based on this experiment. 
Identification and Simultaneity 
Introduction 
A conventional formulation of the money demand function has real 
money balances related to the interest rate on relevant s ubstitute 
assets and some measure of economic activity, such as income or wealth. 
Given the conventional specification, least squares estimation of the 
demand for money is appropriate if one assumes unidirectional causation 
from the argument of this demand to the dependent variable, with no 
direct feedback. However, a close examination of economic theories 
suggests that one way causation from the arguments of the demand for 
money to the dependent variable, i.e., M1, may not be warranted and 
therefore the estimate of the coefficients derived by least squares 
regression methods would be inconsistent. 
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In the process of testing the hypotheses, this study used the least 
squares regression technique to estimate the coefficients. It is 
important to test if real income and interest rates can be regarded as 
strictly exogenous in money demand equations. 
Exogeneity Test 
Sims [74] proposed a statistical test for unidirectional causality. 
Consider the following regression model: 
Yt BXt + lit 
where Xt represents a matrix of observations on the independent 
variables. Sims 1 exogeneity test consists of regressing Yon the past 
and future values of X. If causality runs from X t oY only, the future 
values of X have coefficients insignificantly different from zero [74, 
p. 545). 
Put in the context of the d ema nd for money equation, the exogeneity 
test can be conducted by regressing Ln M1 on the leading and lagged 
values of the explanatory variables, Ln Y, Ln RCP, and Ln RTD. If the 
future values of the independent variables have coefficients insignifi-
cantly different from zero, as a group, then the null hypothesis that 
causality runs from the argument of the demand for money to M1 only 
cannot be rejected. 
Sims [74] argues that (1) the length of the estimated lag 
distribution of independent variab l es should be determined empirically, 
and (2) the shape of these lag distributions should not be sUbject to 
any prior smoothness restrictions [p. 545]. The second suggestion 
implies that no lag restrictions are to be imposed a priori. 
Given these considerations, a general distributed-lag version of 
the aggregated demand for money was specified in the following form 
Ln M1 
4 




Bi Ln Y (t-K) + E 
K=-4 
E ai Ln RTD (t-K) 
K=-4 
Y i Ln RCP ( t-K ) 
1 OS 
( 1 ) 
Four leading and four lagged terms were considered, since when estimated 
empirically, the accumulated-lag weights on income and interest rates 
did not change significantly after the inclusion of current and four-
lagged terms. 
In addition to equation (1 ), Poole [67], Goldfeld [35], and Laidler 
[54] suggest that the demand for money can be estimated by regressing 
interest rates on money and income. The exogeneity of the right hand 
side variables can be tested using Sims' test on the following 
equation. 
4 




Bi Ln Y (t-K) + E 
K=-4 
+ E oiLnRTD (t-K) 
K=-4 
y i Ln M 1 ( t-K ) 
The results of the estimated coeff icients on the lag profile for 
equations (1) and (2) are r e ported in Table XXVII. 
An F-test was conducted to see if the joint coefficients of the 
(2) 
leading series of the right hand side variables in equations (1) and (2) 
TABLE XXVI I 
ESTIMATED LAG PROFILE FOR REAL LlEMAND FOR MONEY 
J::quation (1) !::qua tion ( \ ) Equation (2) Equation (2) 
Regression ~oefficients key ress ion Coefficients kegression Coefficients kegression coetficients 
Coel:'ficients on on on on 
on Lags of Ln Y Ln RCP Ln RTU Ln Y Ln RO' Ln RTU Ln Y Ln M1 Ln R'l'U Ln '1. Ln K1 Ln R'•'U 
-4 -.097 -.008 .001 -.169 -.OOb -.oo~ -1.12 2.28 -.227 2. 76 -.850 .337 
-3 .041 .007 -.006 -. 00(J3 ,01 2 -.027 -2.87 • 471 -.240 -1 .63 -1.21 -.04) 
-2 .111 -.018 -.041 • 11 ~ -.017 -.045 -1 .oo 3.31 .302 -1.73 3.22 .0576 
-1 .186 -.010 -.014 .2U9 -.OOU7 -.00~ 4.96 4.7tl .on 5.43 6.YS -.304 
~ 
c 0 .292 -.014 -. 029 • 183 -.U1 9 -.017 2.13 -9.76 -.1 21 3. :n -:.!.91 -.296 
"' 
-.041 .019 ,007 --- --- --- -2 .U) -5.<14 .570 
2 --- --- --- .047 -.uus -.U42 --- --- --- -1.76 .3!13 - . 097 
) --- --- --- • U44 .UUY .OU) --- ~ -- --- -1 .b) ),!Hl .021 
4 -~- --- --- .u~5 .OU3 .o~ s --- --- --- -.tl42 -5.54 ,U:-!4 
Sum of the Coefficients .53 .043 .OtlY 
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are significantly different from zero. The results of the F-test are 
reported in Table XXVIII. 
Table XXVIII indicates that, when Ln M1 is regressed on Ln Y, Ln 
RCP and Ln RTD, the null hypothesis of the right hand side variable's 
being strictly exogenous cannot be rejected. However, when Ln RCP is 
used as the dependent variable, the result indicates that, in this spec-
ification, the right hand side variables are not strictly exogenous. 
TABLE XXVI II 
F-TESTS ON FU'fURE COEFFICIENTS IN REAL-MONEY 
DEMAND EQUATIONS 
Equation F-Statistics F-Table 
( 1 ) 1 • 55 2.00* 
(2) 3.57 2.00* 
*Degrees of freedom for F-Table are 12 and 48. 
The exogeneity test performed on equation (1) implies that the null 
hypothesis of unidirectional causation from M1 to independent variables 
cannot be rejected. Therefore, the estimated coefficients of the demand 
for money derived from the least squares regression model are not incon-
sistent. However, if Ln RCP is used as the dependent variable, the same 
conclusion could not have been drawn. 
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Aggregated Demand for Money and Simultaneity 
The results of the exogeneity test imply that there is 
undirectional causation from the arguments of the demand for money to 
the dependent variable. However, this conclusion is contrary to the 
theoretical prediction. The theoretical work suggests that changes in 
M1 have a short-run inverse effect on the rate of interest. Therefore, 
this rules out the unidirectional causation from interest rate variables 
to the supply of money. In light of this apparent dichotomy, it is the 
intention of this study not to accept the exogeneity test results at 
face value and to address the issue of simultaneous equations bias. 
In order to carry out simultaneous estimation, the aggregated 
demand for money was reestimated by a two-stage least squares regression 
model (TSLS). In carrying out the TSLS procedure, income and interest 
rates were treated as endogenous. The instruments used were population, 
real state and local government expenditures, discount rate, lagged 
money stoCk, gross national product deflators, and the real consumption 
expenditures. In the process of estimation, it became apparent that the 
TSLS estimation of the aggregated demand for money should be corrected 
for serial correlation. To ensure consistency for two-stage least 
squares estimation when adjusted for serial correlation (TSCORC), four 
additional instruments--income lagged one quarter, both interest rates 
lagged one quarter, and money supply lagged two quarters--were 
included. 
Both versions of the aggregated demand for money, non-tax adjusted 
and tax-adjusted specification, were fitted to the empirical observation 
of the data by TSCORC procedures. The results are reported in Table 
XXIX. 
TABLE XXIX 
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION OF THE AGGREGATED DEMAND FOR MONEY 
BY TSCORC PROCEDURE 
1 952:2-1 972: 4 
Estimated Coefficients 
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M 1, RCP 
M1, RTD 











• 1 0 
.497 ( 1 • 88) 
.236 (4.99)* 
-.0242 (-4.70)* 
-.0413 (-3.19) * 







• 1 1 
*Significantly different from zero at 5-percent level. 
The numbers in parentheses correspond to the t-statistics. 
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Comparison of Table XXIX and Table VI reveals that the results 
obtained by ordinary least squares after adjusbnent for serial correla-
tion and TSCORC are fairly similar to each other. Correcting for both 
simultaneity and serial correlation yields a slightly lower short-run 
income elasticity in the case of non-tax specification, but the long-run 
elasticities are almost the same. 
Given the generally comparable estimated coefficients for the two 
regression models, the results obtained by the exogeneity test are 
confirmed; and simultaneity bias is not likely to be important. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
While income taxation had long ago been integrated into the 
analysis of most areas of economic behavior, the published empirical 
work on the topic lacks direct empirical analysis of the response of the 
demand for money to changes in the tax rate. The possible explanation 
for this lack of interest may have had to do with the fact that, until 
recently, a reliable statistical series on the marginal tax rate was not 
available. 
With regard to the availability of marginal tax seri es, Seater [73] 
loOked across classes of adjusted gross income data and analyzed the 
relation between taxes paid per return and income per return. In brief, 
Seater's estimation procedure involved using the ratio of the change in 
taxes to the change in income to calculate marginal tax rates for each 
class of income. Alternatively, Barra and Sahasakul [3], following a 
utility maximization approach, argued that the explicit marginal tax 
rate from the tax schedule, and not Seater's estimated figures, are the 
relevant proxies for capturing the underlying substitution effects from 
taxation. Using the explicit marginal tax rate from the tax schedule, 
they estimated an average marginal tax rate by adjusted gross income. 
The difference between the two estimation techniques is that Seater 
allowed the concept of deductions--and, therefore, the response of 
deductions--to enter his estimation procedure, while Barre and Sahasakul 
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exclude this notion from their computation. Consequently, Seater's 
estimates .are lower than Barre and Sahasakul's values. However, in the 
process of empirical work, this study found the choice between the two 
is not important for the purpose of empirical investigation. This is, 
of course, a result of the high correlation between the two series. 
Both series give approximately the same results when incorporated into 
the demand for money. Thereforer. Seater's estimated series is used to 
adjust the conventional specification of the demand for money. 
This analysis points out that the unavailability of statistical 
series on marginal tax rates is not a justifiable reason for the 
apparent lack of interest in investigating the relationship between 
taxes and the demand for money. 
On theoretical grounds, it was argued that the conventional 
approach toward specifying the demand for money is to use the transac-
tions model. Despite the popularity of this model, one can also use the 
portfolio approach toward the demand for money and arrive at the same 
specification, namely, a demand for money as a function of a scale vari-
able and the rate of interest. Using the portfolio approach, Demar-
Musgrave (21] and Tobin [81] demonstrated an inverse relationship 
between changes in the tax rate and the optimal demand for money. The 
nature of the relationship was argued to be indirect through the effects 
of taxation on risk taking. 
According to Demar-Musgrave and Tobin's work, as the tax rate 
increases, given that the full loss offset provision is in effect, there 
would be no incentives to take less risk or the substitution effect of 
taxation on risk-taking disappears. Interest income, however, declines, 
and to restore it, investo.rs take more risk by reducing the proportion 
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of their total assets held in cash. Consequently, the risk-sharing 
effect postulates an inverse relationship between the tax rate and the 
demand for money. 
The inventory approach (4) toward the transactions demand for money 
predicts a direct and positive relationship between the tax rate and the 
demand for money. The key element in the transaction model is the 
interest rate differential between interest bearing assets and money. 
Based on this model, there is a negative relationship between this 
interest rate differential and the optimal demand for cash balances. It 
was argued that the imposition of taxation on interest income reduces 
the yields on interest bearing assets relative to cash, therefore 
resulting in larger money balances. The conclusion follows that there 
is a direct and positive substitution effect that results from changes 
in the tax rate. 
As a result, it was argued that the nature of the relationship 
between the demand for money and the tax rate remains unclear and 
therefore an econometric question. 
Further, following the inventory approach, it was argued that, for 
an individual who acts to maximize interest earnings, the true 
opportunity cost of holding money should be represented by the net rate 
of interest. Therefore, the concept of income taxation was incorporated 
into the money demand equation by replacing the nominal rate of interest 
by this rate net of taxes. 
The tax-adjusted money demand specification for the household, 
business, and aggregated sectors, then provided direct comparison with 
non-tax specifications for these sectors and three sets of hypotheses 
were stated. For the household demand for money, the null hypothesis 
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was that the non-tax specification is the true model. The empirical 
tests led to rejection of the null hypothesis. '.rhe tests clearly 
pointed out that the non-tax specification is superior to the tax-
adjusted specification, or it is the nominal and not the net-rate of 
interest which is the relevant proxy for capturing the opportunity cost 
of holding money. 
This result should not be viewed as totally unexpected given the 
discussion of the substitution and risk-sharing effects. In the case of 
the household sector, it is shown that the risk-sharing effect dominates 
the substitution effect. This finding has two major implications; 
first, the tax rate indeed belongs in the household demand for money, 
and second, there is a negative relationship between t and the optimal 
money balances. It is clear that the latter contradicts the theoretical 
prediction of net interest demand for money equation. This is most 
obvious since a net interest money demand function clearly predicts a 
positive relationship between the money balances and ~· 
In this context, the question should no longer be whether ~ is a 
valid argument in the household demand for money (since apparently it 
is), but rather, what is the most appropriate way to incorporate~ into 
this function. In other words, should the effects of ~be captured by 
using a net interest money demand equation or should the tax rate be 
included as a separate independent explanatory variable? It appears 
that the latter is the appropriate approach. This conclusion is drawn 
based on the following: 
1. The fact that the specification tests reject the notion of net 
interest demand for money as the true specification. 
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2. The nature of the relationship between~ and household demand 
for money is found to be negative. This sharply contradicts 
the theoretical prediction of a net interest demand for money 
function. 
The conclusion for the household is that a household demand for 
money in terms of the net rate of interest is found to be misspecified. 
The empirical results seem to suggest that the correct specification for 
this sector is: 
M1H = M1H (Y, r, t) 
. 8M1H 3M1H 3M1H 
w~th ~ < 0, ~ > 0 and~ < 0. M1H is the household real 
balances, Y denotes the scale variable, E is the nominal rate of 
interest and t is the marginal tax rate. 
Following the inventory approach, it was argued that for the 
business demand for money the cost of transacting between cash and the 
alternative forms of holding assets are money costs and, therefore, tax 
deductible. Consequently, the income tax would reduce both the marginal 
costs and returns of cash economizing by the same proportion and leave 
the business demand for money invariant with respect to tax rate. Given 
this argument, the null hypothesis was that the tax-adjusted formulation 
of this demand is the true model. The empirical estimates led to 
rejection of this hypothesis, therefore pointing toward the fact that 
the two alternative specifications are basically the same and there is 
nothing to be gained by including the tax rate in the argument of this 
sector's demand for money. 
With respect to the last hypothesis, dealing with aggregated demand 
for money equation, the specification test indicated that neither 
specification can be rejected when tested against the alternative 
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formulation. In a s e nse, the two equations are basically the same. 
This is, of course, i n agreement with expectations given the results of 
the empirical tests with respect to the substitution and risk-sharing 
effects. In the case of the aggregate demand for money the results 
indicate that these two effects cancel each other. This implies that 
the aggregate money demand equation is invariant with respect to changes 
in the tax rates, and therefore the two specifications should be the 
same. 
The major conclusion of this study is that conventional empirical 
specification of the demand for money was not found to be inconsistent 
and misspecified. Though theory indicates that net rate of interest is 
the appropriate rate, the empirical results suggest that the empirical 
benefits from doing so are quite modest. 
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APPENDIX 
CONSTRUCTING MARGINAL TAX RATE 
AND DATA SOURCES 
Construction of the Average Marginal Tax Rate 
The implicit conclusion that can be drawn from Chapter II is that 
earlier empirical work has misspecified the demand for money equation. 
The misspecification arises from the fact that earlier papers ignored 
the role of the income tax structure. First, by representing the 
opportunity cost of holding money by the nominal rate of interest, thus 
ignoring the fact that interest receipts are subject to income tax. 
Second, by ignoring the effect of the tax on optimal bond holding as 
suggested by Tobin and others. 
This misspecification can be corrected by arguing that the 
opportunity cost of holding money is not the interest rate but this rate 
net of taxes. However, in order to test statistically this proposition, 
one should overcome a serious problem--the fact that there are no 
published statistical series on marginal tax rates. At least three 
alternative approaches exist to get around this problem. First, the 
average tax rate can be used as a proxy for the marginal tax rate. 
Second, an econometric model can be constructed so as to estimate these 
rates. Third, an estimation technique can be applied to come up with a 
statistical series on marginal tax rates. 
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The first two alternatives are ruled out since the average tax 
rates are not truly appropriate proxies for the marginal tax rates and 
constructing an econometric model to estimate marginal tax rates is 
beyond the scope of this research and is a topic for investigation on 
its own merit. Therefore, this dissertation resorted to the third 
alternative and used an estimation technique to compute an average 
marginal tax rate for the economy. 
One estimation technique to compute the average marginal tax rate 
is proposed by Seater [73). Seater, for the individual income tax, 
looked across classes of adjusted gross income from the Statistics of 
Income data and analyzed the relation between taxes paid per return and 
income per return. Seater's technique is applied and his series on 
marginal tax rates is revised and updated in the following manner: 
1. Define x as the midpoint of an income class. 
2. Define MTR(x) = (ATR(x) - ATR(x_1 )/(X- x_1 ); where MTR(x) 
= the marginal tax rate for income class ~' ATR(x) = average 
tax paid for class x (total tax paid by those in income class 
~divided by the number of returns in class~), and ATR(x_, ), 
x_1 denotes the average tax paid and the midpoint of an income 
class for the income class preceding class x. 
3. Step two would provide a collection of marginal tax rates, 
one for each income class. To compute an average marginal 
rate for the economy, a weighted average of the individual 




n y · 
E (..:.l..t."MTR(x · ) ) 
j=1 Yt Jt 
average marginal personal income tax rate at time 
( 1 ) 
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Yjt/Yt = the fraction of total net income that fell wi thin the 
jth income class at time period t, 
and MTR(xjt) = marginal tax rate for the jth income class at 
time period t. 
The Seater estimation techni que involves using the ratio of the 
change in taxes to the change in income to calculate marginal tax rates 
for each income class. However, Barre and Sahasakul [3] have argued 
that the Seater estimate of the marginal tax rate cannot represent the 
true underlying substitution effects from taxation. 
According to Barre and Sahasakul, family income can be represented 
by: 
Y = I + wL (2) 
where L is the amount of work, w is the wage rate and I is the nonlabor 
income. Taxes, however, depend on taxable income, or, 
yT = Y - D ( 3) 
where D is the concept of deductions. Deductions depend on two factors: 
first, the amount of resources that people devote to generating 
deductions and, second, the quantity of family consumption that can be 
considered deductible. 
The relation of taxes to taxable income can be captured by 
where T' is defined as the explicit marginal tax rate from the tax 
schedule. Seater's approach was an investigation on how taxes vary 








It is clear that Seater's estimation of the marginal tax rate, or 
dT/dY, is below the explicit marginal tax rate, T', because of the 
positive relation between income and deductions, dD/dY. 
However Barra and Sahasakul, following a utility maximization 
approach, show that the utility rate of substitution between both 
ordinary consumption and deductible consumption and leisure depends 
partly on the marginal rate from the tax schedule, t'. Based on these 
results, they argue that it is the explicit marginal tax rate from the 
tax schedule, and not dT/dY, which represents the underlying 
substitution effects from taxation. Using the explicit marginal tax 
rate from the tax schedule, they estimate an average marginal tax rate 
by weighting each income class marginal tax rate by adjusted gross 
income applying both arithmetic and geometric averaging techniques. 
As can be seen from Table XXX the comparison of the two estimates 
of the marginal tax rate indicate that Seater's estimations are below 
Barro and Sahasakul's values. Despite this, one should suspect that the 
correlation between the two series would be high. If this proves true, 
then the choice between the two may be less important for the purpose of 
time-series analysis. However, Barro and Sahasakul argued that, "There 
are substantial differences in the behavior of series over time," (p. 
483) and therefore one cannot be sure how important these differnces 
really are in empirical work. 
With respect to this, it is the intention of this dissertation to 
use both series and to investigate the behavior of the demand for money 
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TABLE XXX 





1 6. 1 
16.3 
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1 7. 2 
17.4 
1 4. 6 
1 4. 0 
14.6 
14.9 
1 7. 3 
1 7. 9 
17.2 
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1 6. 7 


























TABLE XXX (Continued) 
Year Seater Barro-Sahasakul 
1974 17.6 26.8 
1975 17.4 27.3 
1976 17.9 28.3 
1977 17.7 28.3 
1978 18. 1 31.9 
1979 18.0 30.2 
1980 18.8 31 .8 
The marginal corporate tax rate was taken from a different source. 
This variable was taken from the Wharton Econometric Forecasting 
Associates, Quarterly Model, Historical ~' selected issues. 
Using the marginal personal and corporate income taxes, a weighted 
average marginal tax rate was calculated in the following manner: 
( 6) 
· Where M1H and M1F are the households' and firms' holdings of currency 
and demand deposits, respectively. M1 is defined as the total currency 
a nd demand deposits in the hands of the nonbank public, t~ and t~ are 
the marginal individual and marginal corporate tax rates. 
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Data Sources 
The GNP variable was taken from the National Income a nd Product 
Accounts of the United States, (NIPA), Statistical Tables, selected 
issues. The nominal variables were converted into real terms by the use 
of the implicit GNP deflator, taken from NIPA. M1 was defined as 
currency plus demand deposits, and this was taken primarily from the 
Federal Reserve Bulletin, selected issues. For RCP , the rate on four to 
six month commercial paper was taken from the Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
For RTD, the rate on commercial bank passbook deposits was used. The 
data for this variable was taken from the quarterly econometric FMP 
model of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. The MB and MH 
1 1 
variable was taken from the Flow of Funds Accounts. The average 
marginal individual was estimated using John Seater's [73] estimation 
technique, and Individual Income Tax Returns. The SALE variable was 
defined as the real manufacturing and trade sales and CONS was defined 
as real personal consumption expenditures and was taken from Business 
Conditions Digest. The study uses quarterly observations covering the 
1952:2 to 1980:4 time period. 
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